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ABSTRACT

Debt-Driven Settlerism: Small Farmers and Bankers in the Trans-Appalachian South, 1800–1820
by
Phil Agee
Advisor: Dr. Karen Miller
This thesis examines how indebted small farmers contributed to the territorial expansion of the
United States into Native lands of the trans-Appalachian South during the formative decades of
the US republic. Taking on debt to purchase land and pay for the operating costs of farming,
small farmers, the vast majority of whom were white, faced insolvency, land forfeiture,
imprisonment, precarity, and poverty. In their struggles to manage debt, they operated under a
creditor-friendly regime rooted in monetary and credit innovations of the colonial period.
Indebtedness repeatedly compelled many small farmers to reenter the cycle of migration and
settlement, serving as a demographic force for expansion. At the other end of the settler
hierarchy, bankers, planters, land speculators, and merchants, backed by the power of a legalmilitary infrastructure, constructed financial networks characterized by unevenly distributed
access to credit. Bank directors issued loans to themselves, bank shareholders, merchants, and
other planters, leaving small farmers with few options for alleviating their debt burdens. At the
center of migration, occupation, and settlement were struggles over land, labor, and liquidity.
Intertwined with the indebtedness of small farmers were the dispossession of First Nations and
the subjugation of enslaved Black communities that together created a crucible for settler
expansion in the trans-Appalachian South.
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INTRODUCTION
Between 1800 and 1820, the population of the combined territories and states of Mississippi
and Alabama, which make up the trans-Appalachian South, increased 2,383 percent, catapulting
from 8,850 to 219,765 white and Black inhabitants.1 This increase was part of an unprecedented
migration during the first century of the territorial and demographic expansion of the US republic
between 1790 to 1890. As the initial phase of this expansion, the first generations of migrants
occupied and settled the trans-Appalachian corridor, which like much of the continent, was under
the stewardship and control of growing Native American polities. By 1820, the white and Black
population of the trans-Appalachian West stood at 2.1 million, representing an increase of nearly
356 percent over the previous two decades. By comparison, the population of the states and
districts east of the Appalachian Mountains increased 43.8 percent between 1800 and 1820, from
approximately 4.8 million to 6.9 million inhabitants. In analyzing the period of territorial expansion
in the trans-Appalachian South between 1800 and 1820, this thesis explores the factors that led to
the migration, occupation, and settlement of what was designated by the US Congress for most of
this period as the Mississippi Territory, which existed from April 7, 1798, to December 10, 1817.
The analysis reveals how the struggles over credit and debt shaped the ways small farmers and
bankers maneuvered within the constraints and possibilities of a settler political economy. Its
central argument is that unevenly distributed liquidity, regulated through a legal-military regime of

1

For the purpose of this study, the trans-Appalachian South between 1800 and 1820 spanned an area of
approximately 100,800 square miles of land and water that by 1817 and 1819 had become the states of
Mississippi and Alabama. The entire trans-Appalachian corridor by 1820 encompassed nine states and one
territory, covering approximately 509,000 square miles of land and water. It ran east to west between the
Great Central Valley of the Appalachian Mountain Range and the Mississippi River and north to south from
the Great Lakes to the Gulf of Mexico. By comparison, the lands on the Atlantic seaboard east of the
Appalachian Great Central Valley, not including Spanish Florida, by 1820 consisted of 14 states and two
districts covering approximately 384,000 square miles. US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
“Land and Water Area of States and Other Entities: 2008,” Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2012,
131st ed. (Washington: US Census Bureau, 2011), table 358.
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credit and debt, was at the center of migration, occupation, and settlement.2
As the leading social force for settler expansion, hundreds of thousands of small farmers, in
their capacity as debtors, bridged the interrelated spheres of short-term conjunctural political
economy and the long-term institutional structures regulating private property and agricultural
labor. At the other end of the wealth ladder, creditors–who were bankers, merchants, land
speculators, planters, and at various times debtors–constructed an infrastructure and markets for
credit and debt controlled by a landed gentry and a mercantile elite. Whereas before independence,
no publicly authorized banks of issue, discount, and deposit existed, the number of state-chartered
and privately-owned banks in operation between 1790 and 1820 increased from around three to
266.3 By architecting and implementing a disciplinary regime of privately controlled banking
credit, the top echelons of the settler gentry muscled their way into power at both the state and
federal levels in the wake of the departure of British colonialists, who during the colonial period
had restricted the development of banking institutions. To the extent the experiences of small
farmers and bankers in the trans-Appalachian South illustrate the larger trajectory of territorial
expansion, the thesis suggests that the success of the agendas of wealthy settlers in relation to land,
labor, and liquidity intensified not only the indebtedness of small farmers, but also the
dispossession of Native Peoples and the subjugation of enslaved Blacks. Settlers transformed the
colonialism of the British Empire into a more virulent form of expansion, resulting in a form of

2

US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Population of States and Counties of the United
States: 1790–1990, comp. and ed. Richard L. Forstall (Washington: GPO, 1996), 4. Population estimates
have been adjusted for late census returns from the Alabama counties of Lawrence, Perry and Washington.
For an analysis the cultural, ideological, technological, and demographic factors that downplays the role of
commodity markets such as cotton in settler expansion, see James Belich, Replenishing the Earth: The
Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 1783–1939 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
3
Warren E. Weber, “Early State Banks in the United States: How Many Were There and When Did They
Exist?” Journal of Economic History 30, no. 1 (June 2006): 433–455; Warren E. Weber, Census of Early
State Banks in the United States (Minneapolis: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 2005).
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debt-driven settlerism.

In arguing for deb-driven settlerism, this analysis takes as its main point of departure
Woody Holton’s intervention in the debate around the motivations for the constitutional reforms of
1787. By recasting the Philadelphia convention as a factional struggle around how to make the
republic safe for foreign investment, Holton opened two avenues for reinterpreting what he called
the capitalist constitution. One avenue was to bring back the socioeconomic research agenda
spearheaded by Charles Beard in the early 20th century. Holton reasserted the role of political
economy in explaining the extent to which ideology reflected economic and financial interests and
institutions. The US Constitution was as much a creature of political economy as it was of politics,
ideology, and culture. A second avenue Holton opened was in revising Beard’s argument that the
interests of creditors underpinned the Philadelphia debates. Holton argued that the clauses
protecting contracts and forbidding federal and state issuance of paper money were as much about
borrowing from foreign capitalists as protecting creditors. For planters like James Madison, debt
was a path to prosperity. If borrowing from France, Spain, and fellow colonists provided the
financial means for establishing the first democratic republic of the Americas, debt could become a
pillar of republican democracy.4
Within the context of the history of credit and debt, this inquiry draws on the work of Claire
Priest and Christine Desan. Priest established how laws and judicial rulings during the colonial
period relating to debtors and creditors established legal precedents that, while addressing the

4

Woody Holton, “The Capitalist Constitution,” in American Capitalism: New Histories, eds. Sven Beckert
and Christine Desan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), 35–62; For a critique of Beard’s
emphasis on economic interests from the perspective of intellectual history, see Douglass G. Adair, The
Intellectual Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy: Republicanism, the Class Struggle, and the Virtuous
Farmer, edited by Mark E. Yellin with a foreword by Joyce Appleby (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2000).
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concerns of debtors, largely favored creditors. In her historical analysis of the social construction of
money, Desan showed how money evolved into a form of public debt involving the collaboration
of both private and state actors who normalized the private management of currency and credit.
Given the colonial legacies of monetary policy and legal doctrines related to debt obligations,
settlers of all ranks who migrated west in the early 1800s adapted to a constitutional settlement
centered around the problems of credit and liquidity.5
In arguing for the regime of credit and debt as a necessary condition for territorial
expansion, the analysis extends the work of Holton, Priest, and Desan by attending to class
interests and how these interests determined the shape of the contestation for economic and
political power. Behind every event were the questions of who benefited, who did not, and how. As
Aziz Rana has argued, a republican system emerged from a colonial context in which the financial
and political autonomy of elites was predicated on the subjugation of those deemed to be outside of
the ruling hierarchy.6 Given this context, state government piloted a legal-military regime–
consisting of courts of law, forces of physical violence, and a carceral system–that reflected
compromises of intra-class factional conflicts while largely excluding small farmers from the
policymaking process. Debtor relief movements that challenged creditors’ rights represented
temporary alliances between factions of the upper and lower gentry on one hand and indebted small
farmers on the other. State legislators and judges, representing interests for the most part within the
gentry, used the levers of government to determine liquidity distribution through state approved
bank charters and the courts of law. Out of the intra-class conflict between factions of the gentry
emerged the answers to who would generally benefit and who would typically pay for the inherent

5

Claire Priest, Credit Nation: Property Laws and Institutions in Early America (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2021), 147; Christine Desan, Making Money, Coin, Currency, and the Coming of
Capitalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
6
Aziz Rana, The Two Faces of American Freedom (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010).
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risks of liquidity based on credit.

While contemporaries and later chroniclers have pointed to a hunger for land, opportunity,
restlessness, and independence as the principal motivations behind migration and settlement, many
have also mentioned how settlers were saddled with levels of debt that induced them to migrate.
Characterized as “Alabama fever” in relation to the migrations of settlers to the trans-Appalachian
South, the question becomes how important debt was as a factor in settler migration and settlement.
In arguing that small farmers made up the largest group of settlers between 1800 and 1820, this
inquiry nevertheless recognizes that analyses of small farmers during this period presents several
challenges. Unlike later periods, very few financial records and firsthand accounts of the lives of
small farmers survive for this initial period of expansion. Additionally, a generalized stigma was
associated with indebtedness, often simply called an “embarrassment,” if mentioned at all. In the
primary sources that survive, indebtedness surfaces indirectly through documents such as land
records, court records, wills, scattered references to small farmers in newspapers, large planter
family papers, church records, and legislative records. As a result, the case for credit and debt as a
factor in settler expansion is inherently circumstantial. Yet if the disappearance of a murder
weapon does not invalidate the act of murder, an effective marshaling of circumstantial and
contextual evidence offers a path toward a reasonably compelling yet nevertheless provisional
hypothesis.7
In making a case for debt as a factor in territorial expansion, two methodological issues

7

On Alabama fever, see Andrew Browning, The Panic of 1819: The First Great Depression (Columbia:
University of Missouri Press, 2019), 103–125; Daniel S. Dupre, Transforming the Cotton Frontier: Madison
County, Alabama, 1800–1840 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1997), 41–46; Robert V.
Haynes, The Mississippi Territory and the Southwest Frontier, 1795–1817 (Lexington: University of
Kentucky Press, 2010), 134–135; On embarrassments, see Dupre, Transforming the Cotton Frontier, 54,
58–59, 63, 242.
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arise, in addition to the question of the degree of indebtedness of small farmers. One is the issue of
the extent to which actual indebtedness, the threat of indebtedness, or a combination of the two
played a role in perpetuating the cycle of migration and settlement that many settlers repeatedly
entered. As a working assumption of this thesis, not all small farmers or even a majority needed to
be debtors for indebtedness to compel migration. The mere threats of insolvency, debtors’ prison,
precarity, and extreme poverty served as compulsions to migrate. The threshold required for actual
indebtedness to play a central role is further lowered by the extent to which small farmers
represented most settlers. If only a few hundred indebted small farmers had migrated as part of
much larger waves of medium-to-large, debt-free settlers, indebtedness would have to be much
greater on a per capita basis to be counted as a factor. The amount of debt held by the total number
of indebted small farmers determined the extent to which indebtedness was a factor. While scholars
have offered estimates of the distribution of land ownership during the 19th century, these
estimates do not cover the trans-Appalachian South between 1800 and 1820. Barring a
comprehensive study of territorial and state tax rolls for the trans-Appalachian West between 1790
and 1840, this inquiry offers provisional findings suggesting that, while the distribution of land
ownership depended on the area, many taxpayers owned no land, and the average parcel size
decreased as the number of settlers increased.

In defining the class of small farmers, this inquiry assumes that in addition to smallholders,
small farmers also consisted of landless squatters, lease tenants, and agricultural wage laborers.
The analysis generally follows the assessment of Daniel S. Dupre. In a study of Madison County,
Alabama, Dupre argued that while settlement of the area beginning after 1804 was initially
undertaken largely by squatters and speculators, smallholders practicing primarily semisubsistence
agriculture began arriving after the first land sales in 1809. As Dupre pointed out, the lines between
6

squatters, smallholders, and speculators were often blurred, as farmers often found themselves
transitioning between one role to another. As cotton prices increased, the number of planters and
large farmers also increased. While there is no agreed-upon definition for the smallholder,
estimates by Stanley Lebergott place the median farm acreage for the Northwest Territory in 1800
at under 250 acres, with a national average of between 125 and 150 acres. As an additional measure
of landholding, the minimum parcel size available for sale by federal government between 1800
and 1820 decreased from 320 to 80 acres.8
Most studies of southern farmers have focused on the mid-19th century and on other areas
of the South as part of and tangential to a long-running debate initiated by Frank Owsley in the
1950s. He erroneously contended that by 1860 up to 85 percent of farmers owned their land and
constituted a middle class of farmers characterized by an equality of opportunity. Charles Bolton
estimated that, in northern Mississippi in 1850, 40 percent of farmers were landless, the vast
majority of whom were tenant farmers despite the initial presence of squatters. Steven Hahn
estimated that while most farmers in Georgia’s Upper Piedmont farmed their own land during the
1850s, about 40 percent owned no land. Building on Bolton’s work, Keri Leigh Merritt estimated
that a class of poor whites owning no land or enslaved people accounted for at least one-third of the
population by 1860.9

8

Dupre, Transforming the Cotton Frontier, 11–13; Stanley Lebergott, “The Demand for Land: The United
States, 1820–1860,” Journal of Economic History 45, no. 2 (June 1985): 185; Payson Jackson Treat, The
National Land System, 1785–1820 (New York: E. B. Treat, 1910), 379, 141.
9
Frank L. Owsley, Plain Folk of the Old South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1949);
Charles C. Bolton, Poor Whites of the Antebellum South: Tenants and Laborers in Central North Carolina
and Northeast Mississippi (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994), 92, 94; Steven Hahn, The Roots of
Southern Populism: Yeoman Farmers and the Transformation of the Georgia Upcountry, 1850–1890
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 52, 34; Steven Hahn, “The Yeomanry of the Nonplantation South:
Upper Piedmont Georgia, 1850–1860,” in Class, Conflict, and Consensus: Antebellum Southern Community
Studies, eds. Orville Vernon Burton and Robert C. McMath, Jr. (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982), 34;
Dupre, Transforming the Cotton Frontier, 21; Keri Leigh Merritt, Masterless Men: Poor Whites and Slavery
in the Antebellum South (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 3.

7

While the traditional dividing line between farmers and planters has been the ownership of
20 or more slaves, establishing a threshold between large farmers and smallholders has tended to
revolve around the question of the degree of farming dedicated to meeting subsistence needs versus
farming a cash crop for distant markets. For this inquiry, small farmers tended to produce cash
crops for markets as a supplementary source of income, to some extent depending on their
proximity to local marketplaces. As they increased their share of cash crops, they were pulled
further into the markets for agricultural commodities as well as the markets for land and
agricultural credit. Informal credit networks existing outside of or parallel to the world of bankbased credit reflected a different scale of surplus directed more toward expanding production than
accumulation.10
While most small farmers were white settlers of European descent, there were also free and
enslaved Blacks and Native Americans who farmed in the trans-Appalachian South. The extent of
small farming by Blacks and any indebtedness that resulted from their farming is difficult to
estimate. In 1820, the combined population of free Blacks in Mississippi and Alabama stood at
over 1,000, most of whom lived in towns. Enslaved Blacks, who in 1820 numbered 74,693,
cultivated their own gardens and were also hired out as agricultural wage laborers. Population
estimates of the Native Nations of the trans-Appalachian South in 1820 range from approximately
30,000 to 40,000. As a result, this analysis assumes that not all small farmers were white, and the
debt Black and Native American farmers took on contributed to the circuits of credit and debt that

10

Dupre, Transforming the Cotton Frontier, 35; As Steven Hahn argued this does not however mean that
small farmers were capitalists or entrepreneurs. Given the scarcity of cash, cotton and other crops produced
in relatively low quantities would have been delivered for settlement of credit, exchange in kind, and only
partially for cash. Hahn, “The Yeomanry of the Nonplantation South,” 34–35, 48; For the Jacksonian period,
Thomas Abernethy divided the social structure into “the wealthy slaveowner, the small slaveowner, the
land-owning farmer or yeoman, and the landless farmer or “squatter.” Thomas Perkins Abernethy, “Social
Relations and Political Control in the Old Southwest,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review 16, no. 4
(March 1930): 529.
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developed during this period.11

While the indebtedness of small farmers factored into settler expansion, the dispossession
of Native Americans and the subjugation of enslaved Blacks also played crucial roles in shaping
the kind and degree of migration and settlement. Native Americans, enslaved Blacks, and indebted
small farmers contributed in their own ways to different aspects of the networks of credit and debt.
The lands ceded by Native Nations due to coerced debt with Indian trading companies became part
of the federal government’s public domain. They were then sold on credit to indebted small
farmers. Settlers financed land acquisitions using enslaved people as a form of liquidity and
collateral. Much of the lending by banks in the trans-Appalachian South derived from the labor of
enslaved Blacks working on the plantations.
Besides their roles in the credit system, Native Americans and enslaved Blacks, like small
farmers, were caught up in migrations that fueled settler expansion. Migrant settlers used trails and
roads established and maintained by Native Americans. Settlers adapted to and borrowed from a
wide array of skills, customs, and institutions belonging to Native Americans and Blacks who
shaped the character and political economy of migration and settlement.

In addition to the new histories of capitalism and scholarship on southern agrarian labor,
this inquiry draws on histories of banking, debt, and economic crises during the early US republic.

11

US Department of Commerce, Population Division of the Bureau of the Census, Historical Census
Statistics On Population Totals by Race, 1790 to 1990, and by Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990, for the
United States, Regions, Divisions, and States, by Campbell Gibson and Kay Jung (Washington: GPO,
2002), tables 15, 39; Daniel Usner, “American Indians on the Cotton Frontier: Changing Economic
Relations with Citizens and Slaves in the Mississippi Territory” Journal of American History 72, no. 2
(September 1985): 317; Samuel R. Brown, The Western Gazetteer, or, Emigrant’s Directory, Containing A
Geographical Description of the Western States and Territories [. . .] (Auburn: H.C. Southwick, 1817),
242–245.

9

In exploring the factors behind settler expansion, the narrative connects settler colonial studies to
the larger story of North American history. Issues and questions addressed by the research around
land and labor in the trans-Appalachian South lie at the intersection of the history of the public
lands and southern history.12

The exploration of territorial expansion in the trans-Appalachian South within the context
of credit and debt begins with the tobacco debt of the Natchez plantocracy, the formation of
counties of the Mississippi Territory, and the economics of semisubsistence farming (Chapter
One). Having set the legal-military and socioeconomic context for the region, the narrative

12

Notable treatments and discussions of the new histories of Capitalism include Jürgen Kocka, Marcel van
der Linden, eds., Capitalism: The Reemergence Of A Historical Concept (London: Bloomsbury Academic,
2016). Sven Beckert, Empire of Cotton: A Global History (New York: Vintage, 2015); Sven Beckert,
Christine Desan, eds., American Capitalism: New Histories (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018);
Seth Rockman, “What Makes the History of Capitalism Newsworthy?” Journal of the Early Republic 34,
no. 3 (Fall 2014): 439–466; For histories of southern agrarian labor, see Steven Hahn, The Roots of Southern
Populism: Yeoman Farmers and the Transformation of the Georgia Upcountry, 1850–1890 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1983); Keri Leigh Merritt, Masterless Men: Poor Whites and Slavery in the Antebellum
South (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Allan Kulikoff, The Agrarian Origins of American
Capitalism (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1992); Eugene D. Genovese, The Political
Economy of Slavery: Studies in the Economy and Society of the Slave South, 2nd ed. (Middletown:
Wesleyan University Press, 1989); For the prevalence of debt in early America and the republic, see Joyce
Appleby, Inheriting the Revolution: The First Generation of Americans (Cambridge: Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 2000); For histories of credit and debt, see Edward J. Balleisen, Navigating
Failure: Bankruptcy and Commercial Society in Antebellum America (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2001); Rowena Olegario, The Engine of Enterprise: Credit in America (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2016); Scott Reynolds Nelson, A Nation of Deadbeats: An Uncommon History of
America’s Financial Disasters (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012); Bruce Mann, Republic of Debtors:
Bankruptcy in the Age of American Independence (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002). For
histories of banking and economic crises, see Howard Bodenhorn, State Banking in Early America: A New
Economic History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Andrew Browning, The Panic of 1819: The
First Great Depression (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2019); For settler colonialism, see Walter
L. Hixson, American Settler Colonialism: A History (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Allan Greer,
“Settler Colonialism and Beyond,” Journal of the Canadian Historical Association 30, no. 1 (2019): 61–86;
For histories of the public lands and the Old Southwest, see Malcolm J. Rohrbough, The Land Office
Business: The Settlement and Administration of the Public Lands, 1789–1837 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1986); Daniel S. Dupre, Transforming the Cotton Frontier: Madison County, Alabama, 1800–1840
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1997); Robert V. Haynes, The Mississippi Territory and
the Southwest Frontier, 1795–1817 (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2010).
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chronicles the first decade of the Mississippi Territory, which was dominated by problems related
to conflicting land claims. By the beginning of the second decade in 1809, public land auctions and
bankers’ weekly discounting days appeared on the scene, ushering in a period of intensified credit
expansion (Chapter Two). Increases in the prices for cotton and land combined with credit
expansion and indebtedness reached an unsustainable level. Just as the states of Mississippi and
Alabama came into being, a nationwide banking collapse paralyzed the economies of southern
trans-Appalachian communities (Chapter Three). By the end of 20 years of the occupation and
settlement of the trans-Appalachian South, top echelons from the settler ranks had commandeered
the reigns of legal-military and economic power, setting the stage for a radically intensified period
of expansion into the Native lands of the trans-Mississippi West (Conclusion).

11

CHAPTER ONE:
INDEBTED SMALL FARMERS AND THE MAKING OF MISSISSIPPI FARMING
When the US Congress established the Mississippi Territory on April 7, 1798, fewer than
9,000 settlers were living in the territory. Within five years, the territory would cover roughly
100,000 square miles after the cession by the Georgia legislature of its western claims to the federal
government in 1802. By 1816, the population numbered over 75,000, more than an eightfold
increase since the territory was first established. As the territorial General Assembly formed more
than 20 counties, small farmers became the largest class of agricultural producers from among the
settler ranks migrating into the territory. By the end of 1816, the year before the western half of the
territory entered the Union as the State of Mississippi and the eastern half became Alabama
Territory, the average parcel size reported by tax assessors decreased by more than 50 percent over
the previous 15 years. The most common parcel size dropped from 400 to 160 acres. Plantations
and large farms had also increased, but the numbers of smallholders surpassed the numbers of
planters and large farmers. Small farmers, excluded from the credit available to larger farmers and
planters, followed the familiar pattern of taking on onerous debt relative to their assets that
characterized 18th-century agricultural production. These entanglements with debt extended the
networks of credit that undergirded the migration to and settlement of the territory.13

13

Haynes, The Mississippi Territory, 134; Robert V. Haynes, “Territorial Mississippi, 1798–1817,” Journal
of Mississippi History 64, no. 4 (2002): 293; Franklin K. Van Zandt, Boundaries of the United States and of
the Several States (Washington: GPO, 1976), 100–01, 105–06; US Department of State, Territorial Papers
of the United States, Vol. 6, The Territory of Mississippi, 1798–1817, Continued, comp. and ed. Clarence
Edwin Carter (Washington: GPO, 1937), 720 (hereafter cited in text as TPUS); Estimates of land
distribution were compiled from territorial tax lists for 1802, 1803 (for Washington County), 1815 (for
Madison County), and 1816; Mississippi Territory, Auditor, Series 510, Territorial Tax Rolls, 1802–1817,
Mississippi Department of Archives and History (hereafter cited in text as MDAH); Robert Haynes’s
estimates for selected counties in 1805 and 1815 indicate slightly less than half of taxpayers were landless.
Haynes, The Mississippi Territory, 211; Allan Kulikoff, From British Peasants to Colonial American
Farmers (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); James T. Lemon, “Agriculture and
Society in Early America,” Agricultural History Review 35, no. 1 (1987): 91.
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Settlers of all ranks struggled to solve two major problems related to the economics of
agricultural production: the scarcity of money and the time lag between planting and the
reimbursement for the sale of their crops. Settlers went into debt to buy land and to pay for the
costs of clearing the land, farming equipment, seed, livestock, and manufactured goods they could
not produce themselves. Local merchants and factors provided farmers with ongoing agricultural
credit. Country store credit served as a common form of farmer debt when loans from family and
personal associates were insufficient. Creditors relied on the state’s role as the enforcer of debt
obligations and titles to property, which favored those who could afford to pay lawyers to
prosecute suits and defend them against claims by the state and other settlers. Taxes funded a legalmilitary infrastructure based on the rules of territorial governance specified in the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787.14
As with the territorial governments that preceded it, the Mississippi territorial government
refereed prior land claims while setting the stage for the arrival of settlers from the East in search
of cheap land. Overcultivation led many settlers to seek more fertile lands in the territories. In the
trans-Appalachian South, increasingly larger numbers of small farmers struggled with the
challenges of the varying fertility of land, climate, disease, and financial constraints that often left
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them facing the choice between poverty and migration farther west, north, or back to their place of
origin in the East. Some small farmers managed to avoid the twin traps of poverty and the cycle of
migration and settlement. For tens of thousands of small farmers who migrated and settled in the
Mississippi Territory, their exposure to an unevenly distributed credit system factored into their
lives and the larger processes of territorial expansion.
Tobacco, Territorial Counties, and Absentee Planters
“An Enormous Load of Debt”
During the first decade of territorial government, conflicting land claims pitting older
planters against more recently established factions of the landed and slaveholding gentry hampered
the overall settlement process of surveying and selling unsold lands. Nevertheless, two other
processes implicated in settler expansion continued apace: the migration of squatters onto public
lands and the dispossession of Native Nations from their ancestral lands through treaties with the
federal government. About halfway through this first decade in 1804, Congress revised its public
land policy to attract small farmers by reducing the minimum parcel size for public land sales to
160 acres. It did so while maintaining the minimum price of $2 per acre and the credit program
consisting of a 25 percent down payment and three annual installments at 6 percent interest. Yet
debt, as a financing tool, had already been well established at the planter level in the years before
US territorial government. According to land surveyor Andrew Ellicott, many of the inhabitants
consisted of settlers who had “fled from their creditors” with “a large portion of the inhabitants
much in debt.” During Spanish rule, planters had struggled with the intertwined challenges of
agriculture, debt, and titles to land.15 The outlines of these struggles surfaced in a memorial to
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Congress in December 1800 by a group of more than 300 settlers calling themselves “Citizens of
the Territory.” In urging Congress to postpone the creation of a territorial legislature they believed
would conspire against them in their land claims, they pointed to tobacco debt as justification for
their request:
During the sovereignty of Spain over this Territory, government invited the inhabitants to
cultivate tobacco, which was received into the king’s magazines at a price extremely
advantageous and flattering to the planters; this state of prosperity continued for some
years, and created so great a degree of confidence in the resources of the planters, that
credit for slaves and merchandize was unusually extended; in so much, that when this
favorable market was suddenly withdrawn by order of government, the inhabitants found
themselves borne down by an enormous load of debt, from which they are yet labouring to
extricate themselves. The revenues of the citizens are so inadequate, that the small expences
necessary to be defrayed by county taxes are already considered as a subject of grievance.16
By attributing an inability to pay taxes to tobacco debt, the memorialists used debt as a tactic in
their factional conflicts with rival groups within the top echelons of the Natchez plantocracy. The
memorial also revealed how the instability of agricultural markets increased the risk of
indebtedness even at the highest level of the wealth ladder. Additionally, the memorialists pointed
to how credit and debt were central to the planters’ quest for surplus accumulation and how
networks of debt caused ripple effects on government revenues and factors of production. Had
there not been significantly leveraged agricultural supply chains, the single point of failure
mercantile monopolies represented would likely not have led to breakdowns in production and
exchange.
While most land titles acquired during French rule had been reregistered during the
subsequent periods of British and Spanish rule, settlers would have to go through yet another
process of clearing titles with the new territorial government. Land claims came to dominate the
politics of territorial government and contributed to the reluctance of settlers to migrate to the
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territory.17 Unconfirmed titles to land reduced investment in factors of production, delayed the
clearing of debts, and contributed to levels of debt that hampered production. With each new
county created by the governor and the General Assembly, newly appointed county-level justices
and sheriffs would enforce debt obligations and protect titles to landed and enslaved property with
the backing of a network of militias organized by militia districts within each county. Non-service
in the militia was subject to fines.18
The main grievance of the memorialists, however, revolved around the protection of their
titles to land, now threatened by newly arrived planters who had succeeded in gaining the new
governor's support. Land and labor served as the principal means by which settlers passed back and
forth from the status of debtor to creditor. Land and labor represented proxies for credit and debt,
which, while often placed in the background of political discourse, were never far from the surface
of territorial politics. As the memorial illustrates, planters were often heavily in debt. But to the
extent they competed with mercantile interests for a larger share of surplus accumulation, planters’
leveraging of credit and debt enabled them to succeed against merchants through the wide profit
margins achieved by the intensified commodification of slave labor and real estate. As small
farmers began by their increasing numbers to take a more dominant economic role, debt would
continue to influence the financing of both money crop farming and, to a lesser extent,
semisubsistence farming. Few remained untouched by long-established patterns of debt-driven
agriculture. For chains of debt to scale beyond planter-merchant networks, the state would need to
demonstrate its capabilities to enforce debt obligations by intervening to make credit and debt
networks viable for landed and mercantile interests. The structure of the circuits of credit and debt,
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which favored the gentry at the expense of small farmers, resulted in patterns of settlement that
would repeatedly swing between migration and precarity.
Territorial Courts and Sargent’s Code
As the conflicts over land claims continued with no apparent end in sight, Mississippi
territorial officials proceeded to establish a legal-military infrastructure to arbitrate disputes
between rival factions of the plantocracy and a regime that would prevent slave revolts and debtor
resistance. In one of his earliest proclamations dated to April 2, 1799, Governor Winthrop Sargent
followed the pattern established in the Northwest Territory, where he served as Secretary from
1788 to 1798 after operating as a land speculator for the Scioto Company. In addition to
establishing the first two of 21 territorial counties, Sargent instituted a system of courts and
appointed judges, sheriffs, and constables in each county. Initialing dispensing justice over
approximately 7,600 settlers in the counties of Adams and Pickering, Sargent’s territorial courts
consisted of a Court of the General Quarter Sessions of the Peace, a Court of Common Pleas, a
Court of Probate, an Orphan’s Court, a Circuit Court, and a Supreme Court, which doubled as a
chancery court. Taming what the governor called a “state of nature” and “anarchy” in the territory,
government officials ensured that circuits of credit and debt facilitated the distribution of land and
the migration of settlers. Territorial judges enforced the rights of property owners as a precondition
for successful settlement based on agricultural and commercial credit.19
As part of the legislation of the territory establishing each county, the General Assembly
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provided for a carceral infrastructure in each county, including a courthouse, a jail, a pillory, a
whipping post, and stocks:
There shall be erected and established in every county in which public buildings are not
already provided, a good and convenient court-house, for the legal adjudication of causes:
and a strong and sufficient jail or prison, for the reception and confinement of debtors and
criminals; well secured by timber, iron grates, bolts and locks: and also a pillory, whippingpost, and so many stocks, as may be convenient for the punishment of offenders. And every
jail so to be erected, shall consist of three apartments at least one of which shall be
appropriated to the reception of debtors.20
In December of 1802, William Brooks, sheriff of Adams County, reported in a letter to Governor
Claiborne, who replaced Sargent in May 1801, that on account of a lack of repairs to the jail, “one
of the prisoners, a debtor has broke jail and escaped. My own safety has induced me to exercise a
degree of rigor, which is repugnant to the feelings of humanity.” In closing, the sheriff added that
“The jail is extremely insecure, the prisoners suffer much from the inclemency of the season. They
are without fire, and some of them much indisposed, and no prospect of relief, unless thro’ the
mercy of the Executive.”21
In addition to the adjudication of land claims and as an indication of the importance of
enforcing debt obligations, Governor Sargent promulgated a series of laws over two years that
formed what settlers opposed to the governor deemed as an autocratic and heavy-handed rule,
labeling his proclamations “Sargent’s Code.”22 As early as April 17, 1799, the governor and two of
his three judges had issued a proclamation entitled “A Law for the easy, and speedy recovery of
small debts,” which stated:
All actions for debt or other demands for the value of eight dollars and upwards, and not
exceeding twenty dollars, (except such actions as are herein after excepted) are hereby
20
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made cognizable before any justice of the common pleas, or justice of the peace in the
county in which the defendant shall be, or reside: and the justices are hereby- respectively
empowered and required, upon complaint to either of them, made for any such debt or
demand, to issue a warrant, in the nature of a summons, or capias (as the case may require)
directed to the constable of the township, or district, where the defendant dwells, or can be
found; or to some other constable, near to him; commanding such constable to bring such
defendant, or cause him to appear, before the said justice; at the time, and in the manner
following; that is to say.23
Upon a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the law proscribed the conditions of the judgment’s
execution:
After judgment given, in any of the cases aforesaid, the justice who pronounced the same,
shall grant execution thereupon, directed to the constable aforesaid; commanding him to
levy the debt or damages, and costs; of the defendants goods, and chattels, who, by virtue
thereof, shall, within the space of ten days next afterwards, expose the same to sale by
public vendue, returning the overplus, if any be, to the defendant: and for want of sufficient
distress, to take the body of such defendant into custody, and him or her, to carry and
convey to the common Gaol of the county; and the sheriff or keeper of such gaol, is hereby
required to receive the person or persons, so taken in execution, and him, her or them,
safely keep, until the sum recovered with costs; be fully paid.24
In defining the mechanisms for appeal, trial by jury, and restrictions for cases of less than eight
dollars, the governor and his judges reaffirmed the rights of creditors and the punishments of
debtors. In the 46 laws promulgated by Governor Sargent between February 28, 1799 and October
30, 1800, debt, debtor, or indebtedness are mentioned in 54 paragraphs in 18 laws; creditor or
credit are mentioned in 15 paragraphs in seven laws.25
Inhabitants were jailed for debts and nonpayment of fines until paid. In December 1801, the
clerk of the Superior Court in Adams County reported that James Burns, fined $20 for assault and
battery, and John Fricker, fined $100 for manslaughter, had been held prisoners until they had paid
their fines. However, the policy of jailing debtors created problems for the government and the
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territory’s creditors. The General Assembly passed a number of laws concerning debtors and
creditors; and by 1807, a statute was instituted “for the relief of insolvent debtors…to prevent the
long imprisonment of unfortunate people, which can be of no benefit, but rather a disadvantage to
their creditors.” The law allowed judges to release any debtors from jail if the debtor could state
under oath that he had no “land, money, stock, or any other estate, real or personal, in possession,
revision or remainder of the Value of the debt or debts…charged in execution.” As an enforcer of
debt obligations, the territorial government had become a victim of its own success.26
While the Natchez faction opposed to Sargent’s governorship complained about restrictions
on travel, excessively high fees, severe punishments for crimes, and the lack of representation,
Sargent’s laws governing credit and debt received few if any written public complaints.27 To the
extent sectarian factions of the Mississippi Territory reflected divisions in the networks of credit
and debt, opposition to Governor Sargent was more a part of a turf war over which settler groups
would benefit most from harnessing the power of labor and land than the challenges of
indebtedness. While the law and order imposed by the new counties reduced some of the social
anomie that characterized parts of the borderlands, the more significant consequence was the
establishment of regimes specifically designed to enforce property and creditor rights. As small
farmers migrated into the territory during the second decade of territorial rule, the consequences of
debt would take on greater significance. In providing for a regime to enforce debt obligations,
Governor Sargent created a pathway for smallholders to supplant planters as the largest agricultural
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class of the territory.
Absentee Planters and Landless Settlers
More than a few planters during the first decade of territorial government were absentee
landowners. In the eastern settlements along the Tombigbee River, settlers, some of whom had
emigrated as Tory refugees from the US War of Independence, had received lands from the British
colonial government of West Florida. Others received land grants from the Spanish Crown, which
offered settlers free tracts of 640 acres. Some of these planters resided in towns, including Natchez.
Absentee planters registered their deeds through agents and managed their plantations through
written correspondence. A steady stream of absentee land speculators joined colonial landholders,
most notably those involved in the Yazoo Land Fraud of 1795. Speculators then sold their
acquisitions to other land companies. Absenteeism increased land speculation and allowed debtdriven markets to penetrate networks of exchange and production.28
As a sign of the concentration of land ownership during the first decade of territorial rule,
territorial tax lists between 1802 and 1805 indicate that landless settlers and large landholders
constituted the largest numbers of taxpayers. Smallholders owning 200 acres or less represented
approximately 8.6 percent of the taxpayers in the territory, while landless taxpayers made up about
55 percent of the territory’s taxpayers. As Table 1 illustrates, while the average landholding for the
five counties was 742 acres, a wide range existed between Adams County at one end with an
average holding of 480 acres and Wilkinson County at the other end with an average holding of
1,089 acres. The most common parcel size ranged from 200 acres in Adams County to 1,000 acres
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in Wilkinson County. Of the landless settlers who made up the majority of taxpayers, many were
slaveholders and herdsmen. In the most fertile areas of the territory, the largest group most likely
consisted of squatters who farmed on public lands ceded to the federal government by the State of
Georgia and the Spanish Crown. While some slaveholders leased their slaves, herdsmen were less
sedentary, borrowing from the free-ranging practices developed in the Choctaw cattle economy.
Having begun as a home to large landowners, the Mississippi Territory underwent a series of
events during President Jefferson’s administration that laid the foundation for what would become
an accelerated expansion of the settler class.29
Table 1. Estimates of Land Ownership, Mississippi Territory, 1802–1805
Adams
1802
139

Jefferson
1802
299

Claiborne
1802
145

Washington
1803
116

Wilkinson
1805
502

No. of landowners
No. with 200 or less acres
No. owning no land

86
24
53

197
51
102

68
4
77

78
9
38

112
15
390

541
103
660

Total acreage held (acres)
Average holding (acres)
Modal holding (acres)
Smallest holding (acres)
Largest holding (acres)

41,250
480
200
8
2,462

113,436
576
400
6
7,000

58,382
859
400
130
5,934

66,592
854
640
100
3,626

121,967
1,089
1,000
23
9,725

401,626
742
400
6
9,725

Landholding Status
No. of taxpayers

Total
1,201

Note: Due to varying degrees of legibility of manuscripts, estimates are approximations.
Source: Territorial Tax Rolls, Series 510, 1802–03, 1805, Mississippi Department of Archives and History

In 1803, after nearly four years of infighting among rival factions of the plantocracy,
Congress passed an act on the 3rd of March establishing land offices west and east of the Pearl
River. It empowered President Jefferson to appoint two land commissioners in an attempt to
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adjudicate, once and for all, the long-standing disputes related to land claims by planters and land
companies. A number of these companies were associated with the Yazoo land fraud involving
large land tracts to the north of the territory, which had been ceded by the Georgia legislature in
1802 to the federal government and would be then become a part of the Mississippi Territory two
years later in 1804. One of the land commissioners appointed by President Jefferson, North
Carolina Representative Robert Williams, would go on to become territorial Governor in May
1805. Once the land offices opened on March 3, 1803, claimants were given one year to file
applications to register their claims with the land offices. It would take almost five years before the
land offices would begin auctioning off the first public lands.30
A Settler Labor Force Takes Shape
Backwoodsmen, Squatters, and Cattlemen on the Move
In addition to the development of legal-military institutions as an essential element in the
creation of counties, the first decade of territorial government saw the migration to the territory of
squatters and cattlemen. They joined Indian traders and backwoodsmen, many of whom had been
encroaching on Choctaw and Chickasaw lands in the West and on Creek and Cherokee lands in the
East since before the establishment of the territory. Squatters and cattlemen were less likely to be
bound up in networks of credit than freeholders escaping from debt in their places of origin in the
eastern states. Arriving in the territory with not enough cash to purchase land at inflated prices
from speculators and land companies, squatters also occupied and settled on land throughout the
trans-Appalachian West.31
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In his Letters from America published in 1822, Scottish traveler James Flint described the
fluid relationship between squatters, backwoodsmen, and small farmers in Indiana:
All who have paid attention to the progress of new settlements, agree in stating, that the
first possession of the woods in America, was taken by a class of hunters, commonly called
back woodsmen. These, in some instances, purchased the soil from the government, and in
others, placed themselves on the public lands without permission. Many of them, indeed,
settled new territories before the ground was surveyed, and before public sales
commenced.32
The number of trans-Appalachian squatters was large enough to prompt both federal and territorial
governments to pursue contradictory policies that at times gave squatters preemption rights
allowing them to purchase the lands they had occupied and at other times enforced customary
property rights protecting land companies and land speculators. Before his proclamation
establishing the territorial court system, Governor Sargent issued a decree on October 4, 1798,
prohibiting the occupation of lands subject to “penalty of fine and imprisonment.”33 Flint pointed to
the effects of government policy on squatters’ often migratory lifestyles:
Formerly pre-emption rights were given to these squatters; but the irregularities and
complicacy that the practice introduced into the business of the land-office, have caused its
being given up, and squatters are now obliged to make way for regular purchasers. The
improvements of a backwoods man are usually confined to building a rude log cabin,
clearing and fencing a small piece of ground for raising Indian corn. A horse, a cow, a few
hogs, and some poultry, comprise his live-stock; and his farther operations are performed
with his rifle. The formation of a settlement in his neighbourhood is hurtful to the success
of his favourite pursuit, and is the signal for his removing into more remote parts of the
Congress assembled, that several disorderly persons have crossed the river Ohio and settled upon their
unappropriated lands…Congress…do hereby issue this their proclamation, strictly forbidding all such
unwarrantable intrusions, and enjoining all those who have settled thereon to depart with their families and
effects, without loss of time, as they shall answer the same at their peril.” US Congress, Senate, General
Public Acts of Congress, Respecting the Sale and Disposition of the Public Lands [. . .], vol. 1, Part 1
(Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1838), 17 (hereafter cited in text as GPAC).
32
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wilderness.34
To the extent small farmers purchased land on credit, the circuits of credit and debt would also
factor into the decisions of backwoodsmen and squatters to migrate into more remote areas.
By 1804, squatters had begun arriving in the northern areas of the Mississippi Territory
bordering Tennessee and, by 1809, would number over 2,000. In the southern part of the Piney
Woods area, where the fertility of the sandy soil was low, a large number settlers were cattle
herdsmen and livestock farmers whose lifestyle was generally less sedentary, borrowing practices
from the free-ranging strategies of the Choctaw cattle economy. Farther east, squatters found fertile
alluvial soil along the Tombigbee River. While the extent to which squatters, backwoodsmen, and
cattlemen took on debt remains uncertain, the policy of preemption risked pulling them into local
networks of debt. By squatting on the public domain, small farmers also faced the risk of removal
and prosecution by the federal government. In March 1807, Congress passed an Intrusion Act
stipulating that squatters would be subject to a penalty of up to $100 and imprisonment not
exceeding six months should they remain on public lands beyond a three-month notice to vacate.35
Native Land Cessions, Indian Trading Companies, and Migration
Settler migrations followed closely on the heels not only of changes in public land policy
but also of treaties with Native Nations. As the US Treasury Department, charged with carrying out
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the distribution of federal lands, worked with Congress to implement a contradictory federal land
policy, President Jefferson and his generals extracted a series of treaties from Native Nations
between 1801 and 1804 that ceded over 2.5 million acres. While a major turning point for small
farmers in public land policy can be traced back to the Land Act of 1804, which reduced the
minimum parcel size to 160 acres, the turning point in land appropriation from Native Nations
occurred in 1805 when the federal government expropriated over nine million acres from the
Choctaw and the Creek through the treaties of Fort Dexter and Tellico. Here too, circuits of debt
related to commercial trade between Native Nations and Indian trading companies played a role in
establishing the necessary conditions for subsequent waves of settlers migrating into Native lands
appropriated by the federal government for the Mississippi Territory. These events enabled settlers
of all ranks, whether semisubsistence farmers or planters, to locate what one historian described as
“good land at moderate price” that was no longer readily available in the East.36
While the differences in kind and degree between the indebtedness of Native Nations and
the indebtedness of small farmers complicate any comparisons, in both cases, the top echelons of
the settler hierarchy benefited. In the case of Native American indebtedness, US officials conspired
with Indian trading companies, most notably Panton, Leslie & Company, to pressure Native
Nations into giving up their lands. In 1803, President Jefferson wrote to future president William
Henry Harrison outlining the plan:
[T]o promote this disposition to exchange lands which they have to spare & we want, for
necessaries, which we have to spare & they want, we shall push our trading houses, and be
glad to see the good & influential individuals among them run in debt, because we observe
36
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that when these debts get beyond what the individuals can pay, they become willing to lop
th[em off] by a cession of lands. at our trading houses too we mean to sell so low as merely
to repay us cost and charges so as neither to lessen or enlarge our capital. this is what
private traders cannot do, for they must gain; they will consequently retire from the
competition, & we shall thus get clear of this pest without giving offence or umbrage to the
Indians. in this way our settlements will gradually circumscribe & approach the Indians, &
they will in time either incorporate with us as citizens of the US. or remove beyond the
Missisipi.37
In the Treaty of Mount Dexter in November 1805, the US government stipulated that in exchange
for land, the government would pay the Choctaws $48,000 to discharge “debt due to their
merchants and traders; and also to pay for the depredations committed on stock, and other property
by evil disposed persons of the said Chaktaw nation.” As early as 1802, Choctaw agent William
Mckee, working in coordination with John Forbes, head of John Forbes and Company and
successor to Panton, Leslie and Company, wrote to Secretary of War Henry Dearborn,
recommending that they sidestep the prohibition of private companies accepting land cessions
directly from Native Nations by having the federal government pay off debts owed by the Choctaw
Nation to the trading company. Dearborn passed on the idea to Mississippi territorial Governor
William Claiborne. Similar debt-for-land schemes were foisted on the Cherokee and Chickasaw.38
With each cession of Native land, more settlers escaping debt migrated west into the
Mississippi Territory only to find indebtedness again. Unlike the northern and central transAppalachian regions, migrations to the Mississippi territory entailed longer and more costly
journeys for settlers from the North and the East. While most settlers came from the southern
Atlantic states, many also came from the mid-Atlantic region. During the first decade of settlement,
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settlers began arriving from routes along the Mississippi River, the state of Tennessee, the
Appalachian Valley, and the southern Atlantic states of Georgia and the Carolinas. With rivers
running north to south in the trans-Appalachian South, westward travel was hindered by the lack of
east-to-west water routes available to settlers farther north.
The traveling time for settlers heading into the territory could take six to nine weeks. Most
migrants arrived in the Mississippi Territory from Georgia, the Carolinas, and Virginia along three
main routes: through the Chickasaw and Choctaw territories connecting the Cumberland
settlements to the Natchez District known as the Natchez Trace; through Cherokee and Creek lands
that connected Knoxville to Natchez; and through the territories of the Creeks between the Oconee
settlements in Georgia to Fort Stoddard on the Mobile River, which would become the Federal
Road after being widened from a horse path to a 16-foot-wide military road. After the defeat of the
Creeks in the Creek War of 1813–14, the Federal Road would begin carrying thousands of settlers
over the next five years, many of whom were already seasoned migrants. For many settlers, the
journey to the Mississippi Territory was their third or fourth migration. Those migrants originating
in the Northeast and, to some extent, in the South had first settled in the Ohio and Cumberland
valleys, while others originating in Virginia first settled in the Carolinas and Georgia before
moving on to the Mississippi Territory.39
Semisubsistence Farming and the Dilemmas of Debt
As a unit of analysis, the class of small farmers defies precise definition due partly to the
intertwined nature of forces of production and networks of exchange. At one end of the scale of

39

Dupre, Alabama’s Frontiers, 253, 255; Monette, History of the Discovery, 365; Robert Haynes traces
many of the early settlers of the Mississippi Territory, who came from the South Atlantic States, to England
and Scotland, consisting of “the usual number of displaced individuals, including desperate debtors,
criminals of various sorts, bigamists, spouses of broken marriages, and youngsters of dysfunctional families,
most of whom were forced initially to become squatters.” Haynes, The Mississippi Territory, 4. Virginia,
having the largest population of the eastern states until 1820, served as the largest exporter of migrants.

28

small farming, squatters with the smallest parcels possessed just enough land to provide for the
needs of one family growing a subsistence foodstuff such as Indian corn, the most commonly
grown foodstuff in many regions of the trans-Appalachian West. Indian corn was comparatively
easy to grow on a wide range of soil types and topographies, serving additionally as fodder for
animals. Having spent much of what little cash they had on transportation costs, many settlers
migrated through or around the central Appalachian Mountains with little more than a few dollars
in their pockets. If they were well enough off, their savings would be tied up in the wagons and
horses that enabled them to reach their destinations. Having survived the journey to their
destination, squatters and those settlers able to purchase land would identify a plot and begin
preparing it for cultivation. If they arrived too late in the year for planting, they worked as laborers
on an already existing farm, leased plots of land as tenants, or took up the hunting practices of
hunters and backwoodsmen.40
Beyond subsistence farming, farmers, who succeeded in harvesting a surplus, sold it to
local merchants or exchanged it directly with other producers in the vicinity. Selling at prices
between $0.25 and $1.00 per bushel and yielding between 20 and 60 bushels per acre, corn grown
on as few as 10 acres might pay for goods worth between $50 and $600 per year in a best case
scenario. In Niles Register for 1817, Hezekiah Niles estimated a farmer’s annual gross income at
$200. After deducting $26 for the wages of one of his smaller children at 50 cents per week, $100
for wages of his laborer, $13 for state and federal taxes, and $50 for domestic goods, the farmer
would be left with $63. Contemporary estimates of labor productivity varied considerably. William
Darby wrote in 1817 the “quantity of Indian corn that in common years, and on land of middling
quality, that one man can produce, will not vary much from two hundred bushels.” James Flint
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encountered a farmer in Indiana in 1820 who had produced in one year as many as 900 bushels of
corn and wheat. Many small farmers were able to cultivate 20 acres without hiring on wage
laborers. As small farmers diversified by adding wheat or cotton to their planting cycle, the
diversity of crops insulated them from catastrophic events.41
As with other regions throughout the settler nation, the labor force on small farms in the
trans-Appalachian South varied depending on the season as the need for labor increased during the
planting and harvesting of the farm’s crops. From a total of 250 households and a population of
2,080, the 1816 Wayne County census reported 68.4 percent of householders held no enslaved
persons, while 31.6 percent of householders were slaveowners. The household size averaged eight
persons, consisting of six whites and two enslaved workers. Of the 108 households listed in the
1810 Wayne County tax rolls, 95.3 percent reported owning no land and 4.7 percent owned land.
Writing in 1820, Flint observed that settlers in Jefferson, Indiana, assisted newly arrived neighbors
in building their cabins in exchange for labor provided by new arrivals at a future date.42
Despite the risks posed by fluctuating cotton prices throughout the territorial period, small
farmers joined planters in taking on debt to purchase land and enslaved labor that brought them
income from the growing demand for cotton textiles. If they succeeded, they could look forward to
paying off their debts and owning clear titles to their tracts. If they failed, they faced the prospect
of forfeiting their plots and joining the ranks of impoverished rural settlers. In Madison County in

41

Brown, The Western Gazetteer, 49, 84; Flint, Letters from America, 14–15, 93, 102, 114, 276–77;
William Darby, Darby, William. A Geographical Description of the State of Louisiana, the Southern Part of
the State of Mississippi, and Territory of Alabama [. . .] (New York: James Olmstead, 1817), 207. Hezekiah
Niles, ed., “Address,” Niles Weekly Register [. . .], vol. 1, New Series, Nov. 29, 1817, 214; “Prices Current,
Natchez,” Mississippi Herald, September 28, 1802, 2; “Natchez, Wholesale Price Current,” Mississippi
Messenger, February 11, 1808, 3; “General Prices Current,” Mississippi Republican, March 5, 1818, 4;
Lewis Cecil Gray, History of Agriculture in the Southern United States to 1860, vol. 2 (Washington:
Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1933), 812, 815.
42
Mississippi Territory, Governor, Series 486, Box 17981, RG 2, Wayne County Census, 1816 (MDAH);
Mississippi Territory, Auditor, Series 510, Boxes 138, 141, Wayne County, 1810, 1816, Taxable Property
(MDAH); Flint, Letters from America, 207.

30

1815, James Irwin and David Maxwell, each owners of 160 acres, were caught in the larger web of
debt obligations. While Irwin owed money to Maxwell, they both owed money to local merchants
and planters of Huntsville, who themselves owed money to merchants in New Orleans,
Philadelphia, and New York. The chains of debt meant that when larger merchants settled accounts
with smaller merchants and planters, they, in turn, required payment from small farmers who had
taken out smaller loans. Indebtedness forced both Irwin and Maxwell to end up selling their
lands.43
With a legal-military infrastructure to enforce debt obligations, a pattern of treaties with
Native Nations based on land-for-debt, a public land policy based on the purchase of 160 acre
parcels on credit, and a debt-financed cotton market, settlers maneuvering through circuits of credit
and debt established the underlying conditions that would shape the course of the second decade
for the inhabitants of the trans-Appalachian South. In 1809 with the first federal land sales and the
founding of the Bank of the Mississippi, the first bank of the territory, settler expansion in the
Mississippi Territory would begin to accelerate. Within 10 years, a nationwide collapse in banking
credit and currency flows precipitated by a fall in the price of cotton would lead to the republic’s
first major nationwide depression. Small farmers and bankers made different yet connected
contributions to the boom-and-bust cycles, which paralleled the cycles of migration and settlement.
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CHAPTER TWO:
LAND DEBT AND BANKING CREDIT
By the beginning of the second decade of territorial government in the trans-Appalachian
South, thousands of settlers had migrated to the territory, despite the failure of the federal
government to make public lands available for settlement. In the trans-Appalachian West as a
whole, less than 3.4 million acres of land had been sold to settlers out of approximately 56 million
acres of lands expropriated from Native Nations. While the projected revenue for these sales
totaled $7 million, by 1810, settlers had paid out $4.8 million, leaving a debt to the government of
$2.2 million. Between 1776 to 1810, the federal government had paid only $2.1 million to Native
Nations for the lands they had ceded. As the government wrestled with the expropriation and
distribution of Native lands, settler migrations to and natural demographic increases within the
larger trans-Appalachian West resulted in a population increase between 1800 and 1810 of
621,378, going from approximately 8.8 percent of the national population in 1800 to 15 percent of
the population in 1810. The Mississippi Territory’s population increased 356 percent, going from
8,850 in 1800 to 40,352 in 1810. Notwithstanding the sale in the Mississippi Territory of less than
340,000 out of a total of 6,332,306 acres of public land by September 1811, land commissioners,
judges, sheriffs, and militias had established the necessary conditions for an unprecedented series
of migrations of small farmers, thousands of whom in escaping from financial distress they
experienced in the East would encounter new debt traps in the territory. As small farmers forfeited
their lands, many would reenter the cycle of migration and settlement in the Native lands of the
trans-Mississippi West.44
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Three developments stand out in tracing the general contours of debt-driven settler
expansion in the Mississippi Territory during the second decade of territorial government. First, an
increasingly unmanageable accumulation of land debt revealed widening cracks in the legalmilitary framework haphazardly established during the previous decade. Second, a highly
leveraged expansion of credit arising from the scarcity of specie and low reserve ratios highlighted
the risks of privately controlled credit markets. Third, the ongoing fluctuation of prices of cotton
and land stemming from instability in the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars pointed to a growing
vulnerability of the region to international markets. The convergence of these developments would
lead to the multicausal storm that culminated in the banking collapse of 1819 and the settler
nation’s first major nationwide economic depression. As Congress found itself overhauling public
land policy, the state governments of Mississippi and Alabama would move away from entirely
private-owned and controlled banks to varying degrees of state-owned and controlled banking.
Emerging in the aftermath of settler expansion of the trans-Appalachian South was a cyclical
pattern of debt-driven boom and bust that would become a characteristic feature of continental
expansion for a growing US empire throughout the 19th century.
Financing Small Farmers
Land on Credit and Preemptions
As one of several forms of farmer indebtedness, the federal credit program served as an
engine for settler migration during the second decade of Mississippi territorial government. Lasting
33 years from 1787 to 1820, during which modifications were made to the minimum acreage and
price, the program enabled small farmers to pay as little as $80 as their down payment whenever
land was auctioned at the minimum price of $2 per acre by land officers at any of a growing
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number of federal land offices. By December 1820 just six months after the credit program ended,
purchasers of public lands owed the federal government over $21 million, amounting to nearly 24
percent of the national debt, of which Alabama purchasers owed nearly 53 percent. Since the first
land offices had begun auctioning public lands, the credit system had facilitated the sale of over
19.3 million acres, totaling nearly $47.7 million.45
Land on credit provided an incentive to settlers contemplating the task of migrating to an
unknown wilderness, clearing woodlands, and farming unknown soil. On the government side,
officials grappled with the challenges of surveys, selling land, registering titles, tracking payments,
and reselling forfeited land. After establishing land districts, opening land offices, and conducting
land surveys, the federal government announced land sales on a periodic basis. Loan officers
conducted public auctions lasting no more than three weeks, selling tracts at the highest bidder
above the minimum price. If any lands remained unsold after the first auction, land officers would
hold a second auction, called a private auction, and attempt to sell the unsold tracts for the highest
bid regardless of the minimum amount.46
Having originated under the Confederation Congress in 1787, the credit program stipulated
that:
one third of the purchase-money shall be immediately paid, in any of the public securities
of the United States, to the Treasurer of the said States, and that the remaining two thirds
shall be paid in like manner in three months after the date of the sale; on which payment, (a
certificate thereof being previously furnished by the Treasurer to the Board of Treasury,)
titles to the lands shall be given to the purchasers by the Board of Treasury, agreeably to the
terms prescribed by the said ordinance: Provided, That if the second payment shall not be
made in three months, as aforesaid, the first payment shall be forfeited, and the lands shall
45
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again be exposed to sale.47
While initially instituted to compete with state governments that were selling land at lower prices,
the credit program followed the pattern set during the colonial period. This entailed selling large
tracts of land on credit to land companies and wealthy speculators, principally the Ohio Land
Company and land speculator John Cleves Symmes. As Congress gradually lowered the minimum
acreage size and price, tens of thousands of small farmers in buying land on credit from the federal
government found an accessible path between the higher prices and larger debt traps of speculators
and the uncertainties of illegal squatting.48
With the Land Act of 1800, Congress sought to raise government revenues by evening the
playing field between speculators and farmers. The credit payment plan called for four payments.
The first of these installments were due within 40 days, and the remaining three at the end of each
subsequent year. Annual payments included a charge of 6 percent interest. The government
awarded an 8 percent discount for payments received before their due date. Purchasers who
defaulted on a payment forfeited their title and amounts paid, placing the land back on the market
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for sale at a subsequent auction.49
Land speculators used the credit system to their own advantage. After bidding up prices that
shut out small farmers from the auction, they bought the largest tracts permitted by law paying only
25 percent down; they would resell smaller tracts to settlers. Any land that remained unpurchased
would be forfeited back to the government. Their actual cost would only be the 25 percent down
payment, and they would not be liable for the remaining payments.50 To be sure, speculators faced
the risk of not selling enough to cover their down payment. Still, for many, the risk was
considerably lower than the risks many small farmers took on through the debt they acquired in
order to purchase land and pay for the costs of small-scale agriculture. The credit program provided
land companies additional returns on investment that would parallel the income a growing number
of banks were deriving from the credit they issued to banking customers, many of whom were
speculators and planters. Speculators then resold lands to settlers for a profit.
With the delay of public land sales in the Mississippi Territory resulting from infighting
over land claims by rival factions of the Mississippi gentry, public land sales did not begin to take
off until after 1807. However, the credit program had been well under way in the Northwest
Territory. In April 1806, the Treasury Department reported to Congress that, by October 1805,
purchasers in Ohio owed the government $2,094,305 and noted that “the debt, in course of the last
two years, has nearly doubled, and it must continue to increase, not only in proportion to the
increase in sales, but from an accumulation of arrears, arising from failure in punctuality of
payment.” By September 1819, the federal government had extended $27.3 million in credit to
purchasers in Mississippi and Alabama, representing 73.5 percent of the total unpaid balance in the
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trans-Appalachian West.51
The credit program helped accelerate land sales in the Mississippi Territory that had been
delayed by the conflicts and disputes over land titles. By the end of September 1811, federal land
officers in the eastern half of the Mississippi Territory had sold 339,308 acres, representing only
5.7 percent of a total of 5,250,703 acres sold in the trans-Appalachian West. By the close of
September 1819, land officers in the newly established states of Mississippi and Alabama had sold
nearly 4.8 million acres. As incoming migrants took advantage of the credit program, established
squatters looked to the preemption program that allowed them to purchase public lands they had
illegally moved onto and improved.52
As Congress passed laws prohibiting squatting on public lands, it added preemption clauses
to most of the public land acts during and subsequent to the Mississippi territorial period. While the
prohibition of illegal settlement on public lands and orders for removal by force date back to 1785,
the Confederation Congress began a practice of granting preemptions as early as 1789 to land
companies. In March of 1799, Congress began allowing preemption claims for settlers who had
purchased tracts in the Northwest Territory from speculators who did not actually own the land.
With the Land Act of May 1800, Congress recognized preemption claims on the basis of
occupancy. In the Mississippi Territory in August 1802, several hundred settlers submitted a
petition to Congress asking the government to open a land office and, at the same time, grant them
preemption rights for lands they had occupied while waiting for the land office to be opened. With
the Land Act of March 1803, the government recognized British and Spanish land grants held by
settlers inhabiting and cultivating lands in October 1795, while those settlers inhabiting and
cultivating lands without prior grants received up to 640 acres. For those inhabiting and cultivating

51
52

ASP: Public Lands, 1:265.
ASP: Public Lands, 2:370–71, 1:265, 3:371.

37

lands in March 1798, the government granted preemption rights enabling them to purchase up to
640 acres at the minimum price free of interest charges for land bought on credit.53 Three years
later in April 1806, Congress reaffirmed preemption rights adding that
persons entitled to a right of pre-emption to lands in the Mississippi Territory, by virtue of
certificates granted by either of the boards of commissioners aforesaid, shall be allowed till
the first day of January, one thousand eight hundred and seven, to make the first payment of
the purchase money of such lands: And if any such person shall neglect to make such first
payment on or before the first day of January, one thousand eight hundred and seven, his
right of pre-emption shall cease and become void.54
Congress required preemptioners to follow the rules and deadlines of purchasers, losing their
preemption rights should other claimants submit bona fide claims for the same land.
Preemption, however, merely postponed farmers’ indebtedness, since preemptioners would
be required to take on credit if they could not pay the full price of the land they had occupied. As
petitions requesting preemptions streamed into Congress between 1805 and 1809, preemption
became a pathway for many settlers who had taken the risk of squatting on public lands and were
now willing to exchange the insecurity of illegal farming for the insecurity of land debt. Unlike the
credit program which ended in April 1820, the government would continue enacting preemption
laws throughout the following decades. In weighing the property rights of the public at large
against the private property rights of settlers, legislators in Congress opted to protect settlers’
interests and promote settler expansion through the commodification of the public domain.55
Forfeitures and Insolvencies
With annual payments dropping from approximately $160 in 1800 to $80 after 1804 for
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lands bought at $2 per acre, many small farmers nevertheless encountered difficulties paying off
their land debt given the underlying risks of farming in the early decades of the 19th century. As
early as January 1797, the Treasury Department began reporting on forfeitures to the House of
Representatives.56 In the Land Act of 1800, Congress reaffirmed the forfeiture of land by
proclaiming that
If any tract shall not be completely paid for within one year after the date of the last
payment, the tract shall be advertised for sale by the register of the land office within whose
district it may lie, in at least five of the most public places in the said district, for at least
thirty days before the time of sale. And he shall sell the same at public vendue….57
As speculators and small farmers attempted with varying degrees of success to use the
credit program to their advantage, forfeitures began to increase throughout the trans-Appalachian
West. The settler state had two unwieldy expansionist initiatives in play. As it expropriated lands
from Native Nations using land-for-debt schemes, the government then sold these lands to settlers
on credit. In subjecting Native Americans and small farmers to the tools of credit and debt, the state
encountered limits within which it maneuvered to construct an empire for a gentry divided by rival
factions yet united by the common goal of Indian dispossession, territorial expansion, and
successful competition with rival Atlantic powers.
By 1806, the problem of land forfeitures had become a significant concern of the federal
government. In March, Treasury Secretary Gallatin warned the House of Representatives that
the accumulation of a debt of two millions of dollars, due by more than two thousand heads
of families, and which is every day increasing in amount, and extending to a greater number
of persons, may ultimately create in that section of the Union, a powerful interest, hostile to
the Federal Government, and which would endanger both the outstanding debt and the
lands unsold.58
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By 1812, estimates of the number of debtor families had climbed to between 7,000 and 10,000.
Ohio Senator Thomas Worthington, Chairman of the Committee on Public Lands, reported to the
Senate that $98,579 had been forfeited throughout the trans-Appalachian West. Noting an
unexpectedly low figure, Worthington nevertheless observed that the resale of forfeited lands for
the remaining amount due represented a second forfeiture by the original purchaser to the new
purchaser. He calculated that the actual amount of forfeited lands approached $200,000. For
settlers in Ohio alone, this amounted to $33,000 and an annual sale of 1,020 tracts “on account of
failure in payment.”59 Additionally,
When the present system pervades the whole country, when the public have lands for sale
extending from the lakes to the Gulf of Mexico, and if, from causes which have been
heretofore mentioned, a considerable portion of purchasers should become hostile to the
Government, there is much reason to apprehend, in a political point of view, the most
dangerous consequences from such a state of things.60
The high rate of debt delinquency and possibly the echoes of Shays’s Rebellion of 1786–87
and the Whiskey Rebellion of 1791–94 moved the Committee to recommend a series of major
changes to the land distribution program largely in favor of small farmers’ interests. The
Committee proposed to reduce the minimum plot size to 80 acres, reduce the price, “extend the
time of payment to purchasers who have not completed their instalments,” and discontinue the
credit program. Congress had already begun extending payment deadlines as early as March 1803
when it granted preemption to settlers who had bought land from the land speculator John Cleves
Symmes. In March 1809, it passed an act that “allowed a further term of two years for the payment
of the residue of the principal due on account of such purchase.” This was followed by nearly
annual extensions of the deadlines for installments.61
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In December 1812, Ohio Representative Jeremiah Morrow reiterated the proposals of the
Committee for changes to the public land policy, stating that
These extensive forfeitures, are, no doubt, much owing to an unfavorable state of things;
but under the most favorable circumstances, the present system cannot operate to the
advantage of the poor. An individual, who takes the whole term of credit, allowed by law
on the three last instalments, is charged on the moneys thus credited more than ten per cent.
per annum, above those that make prompt payment; and, in most instances, if he possess no
other resources than those arising from the land itself, he suffers a forfeiture of the money
paid, and the land with its improvements.62
Morrow was echoing Worthington, who earlier in February had laid out the debt trap for small
farmers:
A sale on long credit of any property never fails to induce many, from false calculations, to
become purchasers. There can scarcely be imagined a situation better calculated to rouse
the feelings or mislead the mind of an individual whose hopes have been blasted in a
purchase of land. He has made his purchase, and with difficulty paid his first instalment.
The fascinating prospect of five years’ credit to pay the other instalments induces him to
take his family on to the lands, to begin improvements and cultivation for their comfort and
support. The time taken to effect this ought to have been employed in earning the money he
owes, which becomes due, and finds him unprepared to pay it. Perhaps he has relied on the
payments due him by others, and has been disappointed; or, if he has received them, losses,
sickness, (which not unfrequently attacks the new settler,) and the wants of his family,
plead his excuse for appropriating it to their use. The credit allowed by law (five years)
expires; his land is advertised for sale; he is threatened with the loss of all he has paid,
whether one, two, or three instalments. But this is not all; his labor for five years, which has
put his land in a state of cultivation, and placed around him the comforts of life where a
wilderness existed before, is also to be lost, and his family turned out of a home to seek
some new situation.63
Morrow and Worthington realized the credit program was cannibalizing the settler project through
never-ending payment extensions, postponements, and the repeated resale of forfeited lands. By
compelling small farmers to take on credit, the government was beginning to bring the disposal of
the public domain to a grinding halt. By 1814, Josiah Meigs, Commissioner of the recently created
General Land Office, reported to Congress that forfeitures were taking place on quarter sections–

62
63

ASP: Public Lands, 2:604–05.
ASP: Public Lands, 2:368.

41

tracts of 160 acres–with a few instances of forfeitures of half and whole sections–tracts of 320 and
640 acres–and only one or two instances where “more than one section has been forfeited by an
individual.” While small farmers were bearing the brunt of taking on debt, many larger farmers,
planters, and speculators were holding on to their larger tracts.64
In the trans-Appalachian South, forfeitures began to rise rapidly with the influx of settlers
beginning in 1816. By 1819, the Josiah Meigs reported to Congress that $106,396 had been
forfeited by settlers since lands were first sold in 1807. The forfeitures in 1816 alone amounted to
$44,007.37. As the rival Natchez and Tombigbee factions of the gentry divided the territory in
1817 in half and submitted their petitions for statehood for the western half as the State of
Mississippi and for the territory of Alabama for the eastern half, thousands of settlers, most of them
small farmers, were defaulting on their payments. It would take the better part of the next 10 years
for settlers to pay off their debts by relinquishing part or all their holdings back to the federal
government. Through relinquishments, the federal government found an escape from runaway
forfeitures by forcing farmers to reduce the size of their holdings. Within two years of the Land Act
of 1820 instituting relinquishments, amounts owed by purchasers in Alabama and Mississippi had
fallen nearly in half from $12,201,708.93 to $6,444,821.51.65
While the precise number of small farmers who forfeited their titles is unknown, historians
estimate that thousands of farmers forfeited millions of acres and lost their lands. As newly
landless settlers, they faced the options of working as rural wage laborers, herdsmen, hunters,
trappers, tenant farmers, or moving to a new location to either squat or go into debt on another land
purchase. For those settler families who had migrated as part of a village or clan network held
together by sociolinguistic or religious ties, mutual aid and what Steven Hahn has called “habits of
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mutuality” of the community offered the additional choice of relying on extrajudicial networks of
personal obligations that enabled them to avoid reentering the migration and settlement cycle.
Mutual aid could only go so far in insulating migrants from the credit-based web of agricultural
production and exchange that lay beyond subsistence farming. In addition to compensating
creditors for their loans, farmers paid for the court system enforcing their debt obligations through
territorial and county taxes.66
If, for the small farmer, a forfeiture of title to land represented a disciplinary risk of
purchasing land on credit, insolvency resulting from tax delinquency represented the disciplinary
risk of owning taxable property. With territorial government came the age-old system of raising tax
revenue to pay for the costs of legal-military infrastructure, including a court system for enforcing
debt obligations. As early as April 1799, Governor Winthrop Sargent had instituted the position of
a tax commissioner and a tax assessor and required the sheriff to seize and auction the “goods or
chattels” of any tax delinquent should the delinquent fail to pay his or her taxes within four days. In
May 1802, the General Assembly enacted legislation to assess county taxes in addition to territorial
taxes consisting of $0.25 for each 100 acres of land, $3.00 for each improved town lot, $0.25 for
each unimproved town lot, and $0.25 for each enslaved person. The territorial government assessed
a separate and higher territorial tax on land. As late as 1807, territorial taxes on lands continued to
apply to British and Spanish land patents and for preemption claims since the land office had yet to
resolve the pre-territorial occupation of land prior to the establishment of the land office. The
territorial poll tax was set to $1 per white male between the ages of 21 and 50, as well as for “free
negroes, mulattoes, and mistigoes between the ages of 18 and 50.” The tax for each enslaved
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person was set to $0.75. Territorial tax on land ranged from $12 to $0.50 per acre, depending on six
classifications based on location subdivided by quality. While land in Natchez carried the highest
tax, land in the piney woods east of the Pearl River carried the lowest tax. Lawyers and doctors,
known as professors of law and professors of physic, paid a tax of $10 each. The government
required payment in gold or silver coin or with government certificates issued to territorial
government officials for services rendered. Tax collectors received 7.5 percent on the amount they
collected.67
Tax delinquents who did not pay their taxes were classified as insolvents. From 1806 to
1817, the number of insolvents ranged in each county from approximately half a dozen to several
dozen. Tax collectors received additional compensation for tracking insolvents. While insolvents
included larger landholders owning 640 or more acres, many were listed as owing only the $1 poll
tax, implying that many insolvents were landless settlers. Of approximately 154 insolvents in
Adams County between 1811 and 1813, three owned land, four owned town lots, five sold
merchandise, two owned pleasure carriages, and 19 held enslaved persons, with 130 insolvents
owning no taxable property. The wealthiest insolvent was Robert Williams, who in 1813 owned
land valued at $2,500, two pleasure carriages, and held 25 enslaved persons.68
Petitions and Land Relief
Landowners of all ranks found common ground in organizing to pressure the federal
government into loosening the terms and conditions of the debt they had taken on to purchase
public lands. The threat of forfeiture and other state enforced prohibitions and penalties contributed
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to collective actions for land debt relief. Throughout the period during which trans-Appalachian
lands were sold off, purchasers of public lands presented Congress with a steady stream of petitions
and memorials requesting various relief measures related to public land policies. As early as 1805,
settlers in Ohio were petitioning Congress for relief related to public land sales. Petitioners
included settlers of all ranks, including planters and speculators who also took advantage of the
credit program. However, unlike small farmers, many planters and speculators had enough means
to absorb their losses without falling into more precarious conditions. The sale of federal land on
credit over 33 years created what one historian writing at the turn of the 20th century called a
debtor class. During the first decade of the 19th century, the percentage of payments in arrears
reached as high as 40.6 percent of balances due from purchasers. Congress added a further
constraint in April 1806 when it required purchases to be made in cash and curtailed the use of
certificates and receipts of public debt.69
A petition submitted to Congress in November 1805 by 128 settlers requested that “an
extension of the times for their future payments may be granted and a remission of Interest on the
several instalments.” The petitioners complained that trade with New Orleans had declined and
That under these Circumstances should the terms which your Petitioners contracted be
rigorously insisted upon they must be turned adrift in the World with their families, and
others reap the benefit of their labour, who perhaps have not experienced the dangers
attendant on a long Indian War, nor been subjected to the extreme hardships and expences
of Cultivating a Wilderness nor had any Share in bringing the country to its present
promising state.70
With forfeitures dating back to the late 1780s, relief measures sought by settlers of various ranks
included extensions of time, lower prices, and an end to the credit payment program.71
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In January 1809, petitioners were claiming, according to Committee Chairman Morrow,
that the Embargo Act of 1807 initiated by former President Jefferson had “by the general
suspension of commerce” along with “the intervention of legal impediments to the recovery of
debts” deprived them “of the means of fulfilling their engagements with the United States, as
thereby they have lost a market for the produce of their farms, and are unable to collect the money
due to them in the States from whence they emigrated.” Morrow warned that “unless relief is
afforded, numerous instances will occur of failure in individuals to complete their payments within
the term prescribed by law” and, given the total amount of accumulating arrears of payments,
“numerous cases of delinquency will occur.” He concluded that the credit program had created a
conflict of interest between land purchasers and the nation as a whole. By reducing the purchase
price, purchasers would still benefit despite the elimination of the credit payment plan. Despite the
Committee’s opinions in favor of the petitioners requests, the credit program would remain in place
for another decade.72
In December 1811, the House Committee on the Public Lands deliberated on a memorial of
the Legislative Council and House of Representatives of the Indiana Territory. The memorial
requested that a refund of interest charges be issued, that back interest be canceled, and that a grace
period of two years be granted for nonpayment before forfeitures arise from the “failure in
completing the payment of the purchase money.”73 In accepting that an extension would only be
reasonable as a “temporary measure for immediate relief” and not as a standard policy going
forward, the Committee added:
The low price of produce, and the consequent scarcity of money in the western country, are
circumstances of real embarrassment to the purchaser, who must shortly complete his
payments, or forfeit his land. In addition to that, the late Indian hostilities on the western
frontier (should it terminate in the most favorable manner) will tend to frustrate the
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exertions of the purchaser to fulfill his engagements to the Government.74
In early December 1812, the House Committee on Public Lands reported on petitions from
settlers in the Mississippi Territory requesting “prolonging the time of payment on purchases made
prior to the 1st of April 1809, and of reducing the price, the subdividing the quarter sections, in
future sales.” The petitioners blamed their inability to pay on Congress’s recently declared war
against Great Britain. According to the Committee, the suspension of the Cotton trade had
adversely affected the South, while in the North economic conditions were “in a small
degree…above their usual rates, arising from the demand for supplies to the army.” The Committee
restated its earlier prediction that forfeitures in the state of Ohio would reach $400,000 within the
following two years.75 It reported that
These extensive forfeitures, are, no doubt, much owing to an unfavorable state of things;
but under the most favorable circumstances, the present system cannot operate to the
advantage of the poor. An individual, who takes the whole term of credit, allowed by law
on the three last instalments, is charged on the moneys thus credited more than ten per cent.
per annum, above those that make prompt payment; and, in most instances, if he possess no
other resources than those arising from the land itself, he suffers a forfeiture of the money
paid, and the land with its improvements.76
While petitioners seeking an extension on land payments were planters as well as small farmers, it
was small farmers entering the cash crop market and attempting to capitalize on the higher cotton
prices who were more likely to forfeit their lands. As the price of short-staple cotton in New
Orleans and American middling Liverpool continued to fluctuate throughout the 1810s with a longterm downward trend beginning in the mid 1820s, small farmers were limited in their ability to use
cash crops to help make payments toward the principal and for interest on their debts.77
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Two years later, memorialists continued submitting memorials requesting relief and better
purchasing terms. The memorials pointed to the “scarcity of money and the high prices of the
public lands,” “the calamities of war,” and “the back interest which has accrued upon the money
due the United States for the purchase of lands by the nonpayment of the instalments,” requiring
extensions in order “to save their lands from forfeiture.”78 With nearly a decade of efforts by
congressional committees to eliminate the credit system, lower the price, and lower the minimum
acreage, the Senate Committee reached a point of exasperation in February 1819 just as the
country’s first nationwide banking collapse was beginning:
If the laws were left to operate in the rigid exactions of the penalties and forfeitures, the
most serious injuries (in the present circumstances of the country) must follow to a large
class of the community; and the effect of relief, by an extension of the time for payment,
while the sales continue progress, may produce an accumulation of the debt, and increase
the difficulty in making the final payments…The experience for several years of the effects
of this system, the frequent recurrence of circumstances which render necessary the
interposition of the Legislature to mitigate the general operation of law, and the extensive
forfeitures which have been incurred, notwithstanding the aid of frequent remedial laws for
the relief of the purchasers, seems to forbid any calculation on a successful operation of the
same system in future sales…In future those fertile sources of discontent and disquietude,
which arise from disappointment, and from the exercise of measures necessary to enforce
the payments, as, also, the frequent distress occasioned by the forfeiture of lands on which
the settlements have been made, would be avoided.79
Throughout the 1820s, as memorials and petitions continued to be submitted to Congress
requesting relief, the House Committee on Public Lands kept a watch on the number of forfeitures
reported by the General Land Office. Between 1821 and 1832, Congress approved 11 pieces of
legislation extinguishing debt accrued prior to 1820. By this time, in Huntsville, Alabama, LeRoy
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Pope, the former president and founder of the Planters and Merchants Bank, had already become
one of the wealthiest landowners and largest slaveholders in Madison County, despite the forfeiture
of his bank’s charter in 1825 largely as a result of irregularities in the bank’s operations and
infighting amongst factions of competing Alabama elites. Alabama’s population had risen from
9,046 in 1810 to 127,901 in 1820 to 309,527 in 1830. By 1834, Alabama and Mississippi had
surpassed Georgia and South Carolina as the nation’s largest cotton producers with a combine
share of 37.2 percent of the total national output. Most of this wealth and cotton was the result of
the work of enslaved laborers; the expropriation of Native lands following the Creek War of 1813–
14 and the 1830 Treaty of Dancing Rabbit; and the labor of small farmers. Many small farmers lost
a part or all their lands and migrated farther west into Louisiana and Missouri, the territory of
Arkansas, and beyond. The disposal of the public lands on credit revealed how property relations
could bend in the service of settler expansion. As settlers pressured the federal government to
provide relief, the outlines of a settler agenda and ideology emerged. Tensions between
contradictory priorities and imperatives rose to the surface and tested the limits of a selfexpansionary system based on land as a commodified resource.80
Bankrolling Cotton Planters
Shortly after land officers in Washington, Mississippi Territory, had begun auctioning
public lands in January 1809, a group of wealthy Natchez planters began planning for the
territory’s first state-chartered bank. Through the territory’s first state-chartered bank, bank owners
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took control over the credit and debt networks that had been informally underwriting the debtdriven markets for land and agricultural commodities. While the debt obligations of small farmers
traversed networks on the periphery of large-scale banking credit transactions, banks reinforced
and expanded the larger webs of debt settlers of all ranks were compelled to enter into. What
appeared to be a chaotic and haphazard development of territorial expansion would begin in 1809
to take on more organized characteristics with the parallel and interrelated accelerations of
migration, credit expansion, land sales, and demand for cotton. With the focus and priority of
bankers on serving their shareholders, who were largely planters and merchants, the only credit
available to small farmers, outside of their family and kinship networks, was the credit offered by
local country store merchants and cotton ginners.81
The group behind the planning of what would become the Bank of the Mississippi followed
bank incorporation patterns established 28 years earlier when land speculator and financier Robert
Morris obtained charters for the Bank of North America from the Confederation Congress in
December 1781 and from the Assembly of Pennsylvania in 1782. Bank organizers, often politicians
themselves, submitted what became standard charter proposals containing the rules of operation
and details of incorporation to state legislatures for approval. The legislative approval process
involved the lobbying of legislators by bank organizers that included as standard practice what in
later periods would be considered bribery. Once approved, the organizers, who in the case of the
Bank of the Mississippi were called superintendents, were required to raise the minimum amount
of capital proscribed in the charter that would serve as the bank’s capital reserves before the bank
could commence its operations. Charters included expiration dates, allowing legislators to dissolve
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banks they felt had violated their charter rules or for politically motivated reasons. While
legislators determined the highest level business rules–including the interest rate on discounts
typically set to 6 percent, capital reserves usually of no less than one third of circulating notes, and
annual dividend yields set to 6 percent–the decisions related to the daily operations of banks as
issuers of banknotes, discounts, and deposits were left in the hands of bank directors and cashiers.
Thus, in taking over the power of chartering banks that had been the purview of the British crown
before independence, state legislators shifted the power to determine the nature and degree of credit
that underwrote surplus accumulation from traditional metropolitan officials into the hands of
settlers themselves.82
The Bank of the Mississippi, chartered in December 1809, was the fifth bank to be
established west of the Appalachian Mountains. In December 1802, the Kentucky legislature
chartered the Kentucky Insurance Company of Lexington, which despite its name issued both
banknotes and loans. In March 1804, in what would be an exception to the rule of legislative
chartering, William C. C. Claiborne, as governor general and intendent of the Province of
Louisiana before it became the Territory of Orleans, issued an executive ordinance establishing the
Bank of Louisiana in New Orleans. In December 1806, the Kentucky legislature charted the Bank
of Kentucky in Frankfort, and in November 1807 the Tennessee legislature chartered the Nashville
Bank. By the time of the chartering of the Bank of the Mississippi, however, there were already in
existence east of the mountains approximately 80 state-chartered banks. While most banks were
concentrated in the northeast, a handful of banks were chartered in the southern Atlantic states of
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Maryland, Delaware, South Carolina, Virginia, North Carolina, and the District of Columbia. As
eastern banks continued to play a larger role in underwriting national economic development,
upper echelons of the settler hierarchy in the West began contributing to the credit and debt circuits
emerging within the new settlement zones.83
Banking legislation and the political struggles surrounding it reflected the extent to which
the state was an instrument for gaining access to the surplus accumulation being generated by
enslaved workers and small farmers. During the first five years of the Bank of the Mississippi’s
operations, factions in the territorial House of Representatives sought to apply their power over the
bank by investigating its suspension of specie redemption resulting from deflation during the War
of 1812 and by attempting to tax the bank. Not content with allowing the Natchez faction to
monopolize bank credit, the territorial House of Representatives in December 1816, which by then
consisted of approximately two dozen representatives, chartered the Bank of Planters’ and
Mechanics’ Bank of Huntsville, whose name would shortly be changed to Planters’ and Merchants’
Bank of Huntsville. The directors and stockholders of the Huntsville bank represented planters,
merchants, and land speculators in the eastern counties, whose most populous county, Madison
County, had increased its population to approximately 14,200 inhabitants, overtaking Adams
County, the leading county in the western half of the territory, by more than 4,000 inhabitants.
During the same year, the members of the territorial government considered a plan to purchase a
major stake in the Bank of the Mississippi, which would give legislators more control over
expanding networks of credit.84
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Natchez Planters and The Bank of the Mississippi
Of the 13 superintendents who organized the Bank of the Mississippi in the months leading
up to its chartering in December 1809, six were long-established, large planters, three were wealthy
Natchez merchants, while eight served as officials in the territorial government: the first governor,
the secretary, the acting governor, two judges, three representatives of the Legislative Council, and
three elected representatives in the territorial House of Representatives. With 13 directors, the bank
was over one-third the size of the territorial General Assembly. Government representation pointed
to strong affinities between the state and the wealthiest circles of the territory. As approved by the
General Assembly, the charter delegated the task to the superintendents of raising enough capital
stock to provide for sufficient issuance of banknotes and accommodation credit. All seven
purchasers of the initial sale of stock sold in January 1810 were superintendents.85
With each share costing $100, the total capitalization was $50,000, of which the largest
holding of $11,400 belonged to Ferdinand L. Claiborne, Brigadier General and brother of Governor
William C.C. Claiborne. Each of the other six shareholders owned between $6,600 and $6,400 in
stock. A year later, in January 1811, an additional 18 shareholders acquired stock from the initial
seven. The median shareholder stake at this point was $1,600. The smallest holdings under $1,000
were four shareholders, each with five shares worth $500, one shareholder with four shares worth
$400, and one shareholder with three shares worth $300. All other shareholders owned 10 or more
shares worth $1,000 at par. Tax rolls for 1810 indicate that several shareholders owning five or less
shares were wealthy merchants owning expensive town lots, pleasure carriages, and, in the case of
two shareholders, reporting 12 and 27 slaves as taxable property.86
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The three presidents of the bank elected by the 13 directors were planters originally from
Massachusetts: Winthrop Sargent from Gloucester; and from Pennsylvania, Stephen Minor from
Greene County, Samuel Postlethwaite, and Steven Duncan both from Carlisle County. Stephen
Minor was arguably one of the wealthiest planters in Mississippi during the territorial period,
owning nine plantations. The Mississippi territorial tax rolls for 1814, the year before Minor died,
show holdings of 1,476 acres and 140 enslaved people for a total tax due assessment of $152.92,
representing the highest tax paid in Adams County for that year.87
While the directors of the bank were some of the wealthiest residents of Natchez, there
were others in Natchez who had also accumulated extensive holdings, many of whom became
regular customers of the bank. Following not far behind Minor in the 1814 tax rolls was Benjamin
Farrar, holding property assessed at $139.20 for 7,650 acres and 140 slaves. Behind Farrar were the
estate of Scottish planter William Dunbar, holding property assessed at $101.13 ½ for 1,821 acres,
six town lots, and 142 slaves; Adam Bingaman, one of the original Natchez planter families which
had settled in 1777, with property assessed at $98.64 ½ for 4,038 acres and 67 slaves; and the
Natchez merchant Washington Jackson, assessed at $92.32 for sales of $34,462 of merchandize.
The Natchez gentry was in a league of its own, attracting gentry and aspiring gentry from states all
along the Atlantic coast.88
As the bank began raising capital, taking deposits, and issuing discounts, ownership of bank
shares and access to bank credit was largely beyond the reach of thousands of small farmers. As a
bank of discount, issue, and deposit, the Bank of the Mississippi was, in theory, incentivized to
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maximize its revenue by providing discounts and deposits to settlers of all ranks. Yet, given the
bank’s share price range of between $95 and $115 per share, few small farmers operating a
semisubsistence farm could afford to become shareholders even when the shares sold below par.
The standard banking policy the bank followed in requiring endorsements for discounts from credit
worthy individuals made it difficult for small farmers to access credit.89
In addition to requiring endorsements for discounts, the bank protected itself through a
special clause in its charter related to the recovery of delinquent loans. In the third and last section
of the charter, the organizers gained the right to exercise an automatic judgment against delinquent
debtors who did not request a trial by jury.90 Since judges followed the practice of generally ruling
in favor of plaintiffs in suits involving the recovery of debts, the automatic judgment offered the
bank a fast track in its pursuit of debtors. To the extent banking customers were either
overextended wealthy gentry or smaller planters attempting to reach the upper echelons of the
gentry, the protection against debt obligations threatened to have a ripple effect through the credit
system down to small farmers whose accounts would be subject to settlement by creditors further
upstream in the credit chain.
As bank directors issued semiannual dividends to shareholders, reaching as high as 10
percent by 1814, legislative politics related to banking reflected the factional divisions within the
gentry. To the extent small planters and merchants sought greater access to the bank’s credit, they
faced similar challenges of exclusion encountered by small farmers. As the Mississippi territorial
government organized its entry into the Union, representatives to the state convention in August
1817 added clauses to the state constitution granting the bank monopoly privileges. Additionally,
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the constitution specified that the new state government would maintain a 25 percent stake, which,
while not handing over complete control to the government, nevertheless gave legislators more
access to the bank’s credit facilities. In January 1818, the new state government authorized the
bank to be renamed the Bank of the State of Mississippi and took control over the appointment of
five out of 16 directors. While not gaining full control of the bank, factions and the bank’s owners
fashioned a compromise to share the spoils afforded by banking credit.91
Bank Discounts and Insider Lending
During the territorial period, the top echelon of the planters and merchants in and around
Natchez controlled the bank through its ownership of the shares and the shareholders’ voting rights
that determined the bank’s directors. These planters and merchants limited the benefits of the bank
to themselves by restricting the extension of credit and following what the bank’s historian, Robert
Weems, characterized as conservative banking policies. Much of the lending during the bank’s first
years went to the bank’s directors and stockholders. Gabriel Tichenor, the bank’s cashier, issued
credit on notes and bills made or endorsed by directors and stockholders. Unequal access to credit
deepened the divide not just between the more established gentry controlling the bank and small
farmers but also between the bank owners and the more recently established and less wealthy small
planters and merchants.92
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As the bank’s principal credit instrument, discounts expanded the credit available to
wealthy settlers and merchants while excluding settlers operating outside the bank’s orbit in and
around Natchez. By acting as a mechanism of surplus accumulation for the top echelon of the
territory’s gentry, exclusionary discounts created a larger financial environment that compelled
small farmers to take on debt to compete successfully in the markets for cash crops. The
development of a network of large-scale credit controlled by the bank increased the difficulties
farmers experienced as they participated in money crop markets. To the extent small farmers were
left out of the easy credit available to the upper gentry of Natchez, their indebtedness combined
with harder access to credit relative to other market participants and fluctuating commodity prices
contributed to conditions conducive for settler migration. As with other state-chartered banks
throughout the nation, the bank issued its credit by accepting promissory notes and bills of
exchange from payees who received either banknotes or a credit to their account. These discounts,
in which the interest rate was deducted from the amount of the note and the remainder paid out as
the loan, were the most consequential means for underwriting debt-driven settlerism. The
establishment and growth of the bank’s credit lending coincided with increases in migration and
cotton production during the six years between the time the bank began operations in 1811 and the
admission of the territory to the Union in December 1817.
Between 1811, when the bank began operating, and 1817, when the western half of the
territory entered the Union as the State of Mississippi and the eastern half became the Alabama
Territory, the trans-Appalachian South registered significant increases in banking credit, cotton
production, and migration into the region. Loans issued by the Bank of Mississippi, as reflected by

Lending: Banks, Person Development in Industrial New England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1994) and Ta-Chen Wang, “Banks, Credit Markets, and Early American Development: A Case Study of
Entry and Competition,” Journal of Economic History 68, no. 2 (June 2008): 438-61.

57

its bills receivable, increased 588.5 percent for this period from $87,970.01 to $605,651.65. Cotton
production in the territory increased 717.6 percent from 891,000 pounds to 7,284,411 lbs. The
territory’s population nearly doubled, rising 87.1 percent from 40,352 to 75,746 between 1810 and
1816. With a more than a tripling of the average annual price of cotton in New Orleans between
1811 and 1817, rising to a high of 33 cents per pound by August 1817, bills receivable nearly
tripled between 1816 and 1817 from $208,593.02 to $605,651.65. While the War of 1812, along
with cotton rot and floods, disrupted cotton markets, the sales of lands enabled through land
cessions by the Choctaw, Chickasaw, Creek, and Cherokee Nations increased from 81,913.16 acres
in 1811 to 617,090.40 acres. The circuits of credit and debt linking the bank’s stockholders to
country store merchants, cotton ginners, and small farmers facilitated the surplus accumulation
underlying territorial settlement and expansion.93
Following banking patterns established in Britain, the Bank of the Mississippi provided its
principal credit as payment to customers presenting note obligations between parties involved in
the exchange of goods and services. By exchanging notes with maturity dates for banknotes, the
bank’s directors, shareholders, and customers obtained the liquidity they needed for operating and
expanding their plantations and commercial operations. In acting as an intermediate broker,
selecting only those notes deemed secure, and rejecting notes deemed to be a risk, the bank
accelerated access to credit for its preferred customers. Thus, while the bank used its capital stock
as collateral for its banknotes, it secured its credit through the underlying obligation of the
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endorsers and acceptors of the notes, who were liable for nonpayment.94
In the bank’s discount accounting system, Gabriel Tichenor, the cashier of the bank,
maintained records of the bank’s discounts in several accounting books, including a Note Offering
Book, a Note Payment Register, and a Notes Collection Book. These books, surviving as a
collection of approximately 116 bound volumes of the bank’s records from 1810 to 1835, provide a
comprehensive window into the discounts that served as the principal source of banking credit
during the second half of the Mississippi territorial period as well as the first 18 years of statehood.
While the Offering Book recorded the notes presented to the bank, the Note Payment Register
recorded the notes the bank accepted for discount. The Note Collection Book recorded the
unrenewed notes presented to drawers for collection.95
In the Note Offering Book for the bank’s first two years of operations from June 1811 to
June 1813, the average amount offered out of approximately 1,916 notes was $534. The notes
ranged from $50 to $6,635, and the most common note offered was $500. Most notes were in the
range of $100 and $1,000. Many higher valued notes over $1,000 carried well-known Natchez
names such as Ferdinand Claiborne, a bank director and brother of former Governor William C. C.
Claiborne, and Samuel Postlethwaite, president of the bank between 1815 and 1825. In many
instances, these large notes were offered by the same person as the drawee. A small number of
entries had no identification number and no information on the discount or the interest charge.
Another group of entries were those in which the amount discounted was lower than the amount
offered, and the interest charged was based on the lower amount. Rather than rejecting these
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discount offers completely, the directors chose to discount a smaller portion of the note. A pattern
emerges from the bank’s discounts in which the majority of the bank’s transactions were beyond
the reach of small farmers, who were nevertheless, along with enslaved workers, the principal
producers of the agricultural goods of the territory. Many of those excluded from banking credit
lost their lands as a result of debts they owed to the government and to local merchants for ongoing
agricultural costs. Over the course 20 years, approximately 70 percent to 80 percent of the bank’s
profits came from interest on bills receivable.96
Unlike small farmers, banking directors, officers, and shareholders received additional
benefits reinforcing the exclusion experienced by those not associated with the bank. In addition to
semiannual dividends, which in June 1816 reached $8 per share, a stream of additional income
flowed from the arbitrage of interest rates for loans made by stockholders. By borrowing at 6
percent from the bank and offering loans to individuals forced to pay higher interest rates, directors
and officers gained an income from the difference in the interest rates. Additionally, directors
endorsed each other’s notes, and their endorsements likely earned them additional fees.
Shareholders bought stock using the shares they already owned, whether or not they had fully paid
for them. These insider practices were not prohibited during the formative period of state banking
in the early 19th century and represented further incentives for the gentry to organize statechartered banks throughout the nation. The exclusion from additional profit streams put small
farmers at greater risk posed by networks of credit and debt.97
In 1811, the directors established a policy favoring stockholders in the approval of loans
through a list of preferred bank customers, which included credit limits for each customer ranging
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from $500 to $10,000. Of the 15 customers with credit over $5,000, eight were directors, and three
were stockholders at the time the policy was introduced who “shall have preference, on furnishing
sufficient indorsers as in other cases, to discounts, over and above the sums then specified, to the
amount of one-half the stock holden by such stockholders.” On top of the easy low-interest credit,
the stockholders received back part of the interest in their semiannual dividend to the extent the
profits reflected the earnings from discounts. While there was a charter rule prohibiting the
purchase of more than 10 shares in a direct stock offering within the first 10 days of the offering,
stockholders nevertheless were able to increase their bank capital by using credit to purchase bank
shares from other shareholders on a secondary market. While it is unclear exactly how much of this
credit underwrote the purchase of enslaved people and land, the fact that most loans, while having
a maturity date of 60 days, were renewed indicates that the loans functioned as long-term debt
based on short-term renewable obligations.98
Credit, Cotton Prices, and Land Distribution
Toward the end of the second decade of the Mississippi territorial period, an increase in the
number of loans of the Bank of the Mississippi, together with discounts of over 200 new banks
chartered since 1800, helped create the credit and debt conditions that expanded an increasingly
interconnected global market for cotton. With Napoleon’s defeat and a stalemate ending of the War
of 1812, agricultural and manufacturing sectors in Britain and the United States emerged as the
forces best suited to meet pent-up economic demand resulting from nearly five decades of
revolutions throughout the Atlantic world. A North American gentry transplanted from Britain
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adapted the colonial patterns of a constitutional monarchy to a republican political economy
tailored to settler expansion. As the prices for cotton and land rose in conjunction with increases in
the quantities of banking credit and lands ceded by Native Nations, thousands of indebted small
farmers migrated to the trans-Appalachian South.
Between 1815 and 1820, settlers continued to pressure the federal government with
petitions for land relief while land forfeitures increased. The auctions of hundreds of thousands of
acres of public lands pitted an increasingly organized squatter movement against speculators and
farmers willing to take on debt to join the cotton boom. Landless farmers continued to represent a
significant proportion of the settler population. The federal government responded to the increase
in landless farmers by instituting further preemptions. Sales of Mississippi public lands, which had
previously been sold outside the territory to discourage confrontations between squatters and
speculators, increased exponentially between 1816 and 1819. In 1816, federal land officers in
Alabama and Mississippi sold 490,874 acres for $1,102,481. Three years later in 1819, they sold
2,278,046 acres for $9,705,889, of which $2,773,723 was purchase money with an unpaid balance
totaling $12,132,362. Settlers in the eastern half of the Mississippi Territory experienced conditions
that catapulted them from being backwoods farmers and upstarts to the Natchez gentry into
becoming a leading economic and demographic force of the trans-Appalachian South.99
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CHAPTER THREE:
DEBT-DRIVEN SETTLERISM
The legal-military infrastructure put in place by the upper Natchez gentry vying for control
of the Mississippi territorial government during its first decade set the stage for unprecedented
settler migrations in the eastern half of the territory between 1815 and 1819. Justices of the Peace,
sheriffs, constables, tax assessors, tax collectors, and militia captains brought territorial order to
each of the 20 counties that in 1816 ranged in population from 1,000 to 14,000. A network of
courts, jails, militias, and other county authorities enforced the rights of property holders and
creditors. Prompted by public land sales, cotton markets, and, most importantly, facilitated by
banking and federal land credit, tens of thousands of small farmers in the newly formed Alabama
Territory, along and east of the Mobile and Tombigbee rivers, would within two years preempt the
pattern of gradual territorial development established by other territories. The architects of the 1787
Northwest Ordinance and the 1800 Land Act created a framework for expansion that, given the
right context, would lead to unsustainable crises for settler communities. The waves of settlers
migrating into the Alabama Territory in 1818 and 1819 combined with the banking collapse of
1819 revealed the limits of settler imperatives underlying federal legislation.
As expanding banking credit resulted in settler indebtedness, the increase in the population
of small farmers was accompanied by an increase in the number of cotton plantations in the central
Black Belt region of Alabama. Between 1810 and 1820, the number of enslaved persons in the
eastern lands of the trans-Appalachian South increased 8,378 percent. Many of the 41,879 enslaved
workers in the eastern region in 1820 also worked on the plantations in the north along the
Tennessee River. As the demand for banking credit increased, the Alabama territorial legislature
departed from the pattern of monopoly banking of its progenitor. In February 1818, it renamed
63

Planters’ and Mechanics’ Bank of Huntsville to the Planters’ and Merchants’ Bank of Huntsville,
signaling the emergence of a new northern Alabama gentry; in September, it chartered the
Tombeckbe Bank in St. Stephens; in November it chartered the Bank of Mobile. Intensified
migration, debt, and credit fed off one another. Both the banking collapse the following year in
1819 and the 1820 Land Reform Act a year later underscored the consequences of the forces
unleashed by thousands of small farmers and enslaved workers of Alabama, who were forced by
slavery and compelled by indebtedness to migrate to expropriated Native lands in the transAppalachian South.100
Settler Migrations
Land Cessions, Squatters, and Population Shifts
While the spectacular 1,495 percent increase in the overall population of the eastern half of
the trans-Appalachian South between 1810 and 1820 represented the extreme end of significantly
large increases in population throughout the territory, the greatest increases occurred in the lower
Tennessee Valley. As the only county in the lower Tennessee Valley in 1810, Madison County
registered 4,699 inhabitants. By 1820, seven counties running on either side of the Tennessee River
had sprung up with a combined population of 59,969, representing over 40 percent of the state’s
population of 144,317. With the exception of Madison County, these counties had been formed by
the Alabama territorial General Assembly during its short two-year existence between 1818 and
1819. Based in the southwestern town of St. Stephens, the General Assembly formed 16 additional
counties for a total of 22 counties. Following lock-and-step with the land cessions that dispossessed
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an estimated 30,000 to 40,000 Native Americans, the Alabama territorial government met the
challenge head-on of developing the legal-military infrastructure to handle the unprecedented
migration of settlers.101
Between 1802 and 1819, the Choctaw, Cherokee, Chickasaw, and Creek Nations ceded
lands spanning most of the eastern half of the Mississippi Territory through approximately 12 land
cessions or acknowledgments of earlier cessions. The largest cession followed the end of the Creek
War in August 1814. It resulted in the expropriation of 22 million acres, or 34,375 square miles, of
land that covered the central and southern areas of what would become the state of Alabama,
stretching from the Spanish border in the south northwards over the Black Belt and east to west
between the Black Warrior and Coosa rivers. The northern counties which experienced the largest
waves of settlers were ceded by the Cherokee in Treaties of January 7, 1806, September 14, 1816,
and February 27, 1819. The land that remained after 1820, most of which was located on the
eastern border with Georgia with smaller areas on the southwestern border with the state of
Mississippi, would be ceded over 15 years in approximately five treaties with the Choctaw, Creek,
Chickasaw, Cherokee Nations.
Taking the southern trans-Appalachian region as a whole, the population increased 444.6
percent from 40,352 in 1810 to 219,765 in 1820. The enslaved population increased 337.1 percent
from 17,088 in 1810 to 74,693 in 1820. By the end of 1820, the two general assemblies in
Mississippi and Alabama had created 46 counties, 11 during the first decade and 35 in the second
decade. In the two years between 1818 and 1819, the General Assembly of the Alabama Territory
created 21 counties.102
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Outside the trans-Appalachian South, migrations during subsequent decades followed the
availability of public lands. Settlers of all ranks sought to acquire better and debt-free holdings in
the territories of Arkansas, Florida, Michigan. Texas became a major destination for farmers from
Mississippi and Alabama after the 1836 Texas Revolution. Without the federal land credit program,
squatting offered a way to raise cash to purchase land outright or as down payment for land
purchased from land companies. Between 1830 and 1840, the largest population increases took
place in Wisconsin and Arkansas, registering increases of 751.3 percent and 221.1 percent. By
1834, there were 53 land offices selling land in seven states and three territories. Following closely
on the heels of land officers were creditors who, as speculators and bankers, took advantage of the
scarcity of credit and cash.103
Alabama Banking, Land Sales, and Relinquishments
Though banking credit and public land sales appeared to move to their own rhythms of
supply and demand, they operated on the basis of closely interrelated sets of overlapping interests.
One common denominator was the imperative of the growing global market for cotton, which in
Mississippi by 1819 had reached 45,500 bales valued at $2.9 million. Writing in 1819, David
Warden reported on a farmer in the Tennessee Valley:
A farmer in an adjoining country, without slaves, sold his crop of cotton of the preceding
year for 2000 dollars, and that his crop of maize for market probably would amount to
between 500 and 700 bushels. The merchandise sold at this place, during the year 1817,
amounted to 500,000 dollars. A steam boat was to be finished in the autumn of that year, to
ply between New Orleans and that place, or Fort Claiborne, in the Alabama branch. To the
borders of the Mussel Shoals of the Tennessee river there is at present a great migration;
and a place for a town has been already selected on an elevated spot, where there is a fine
spring, three miles below the shoals, which are about 100 miles south of Nashville.104
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As the settler population of the trans-Appalachian South exploded, the Planters and Merchants
Bank of Huntsville in June 1819 recorded $417,834.40 in bills and notes discounted along with
$58,628.50 in bills of exchange. Its capital stock in October 1821 amounted to $156,675, with
$220,088.69 of banknotes in circulation. While these amounts were fairly modest in comparison to
more highly capitalized banks, they nevertheless reflected the potential of surplus accumulation for
planters, merchants, and land speculators in the lower Tennessee Valley. As president of the bank,
Leroy Pope worked with other bank directors to expand their holdings. In 1811, Pope reported to
the tax collector holding 790 acres and 70 enslaved persons. By 1815, tax rolls show Pope’s
holdings at 1,480 acres, 104 enslaved persons, and 18 town lots valued at $2,000. After rival
factions attacked the bank’s conspicuous practices of rewarding its own directors, the bank
forfeited its charter in February 1825.105
As banks failed or closed, Alabama legislators and the governor chartered new ones. Upon
the closure of Planters and Merchants Bank, the Alabama General Assembly opened the Bank of
the State of Alabama, which had been languishing for lack of capital since its rechartering in
December 1823. Based in Alabama’s first capital, Cahawba, and completely owned by and under
the control of the governor and state legislators, it commenced operations with $200,000 of state
funds, loans, and authorization to issue $400,000 in banknotes. As a state owned bank, its credit
would become available to a wider group of planters and merchants. By January 1826, it had issued
discounts totaling $448,859. The state controlled bank offered a way for rival factions to find
common ground in the management of credit and cash. While alliances of small and large farmers
in Tennessee, Kentucky, and Illinois succeeded in implementing debt relief measures through a
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variety of state banking operations, the Bank of the State of Alabama remained largely in the hands
of legislators working in the interests of larger planters and merchants.106
As banking credit expanded in Alabama, land sales began declining from a peak in 1818 of
1.4 million acres. With the amount of sold land tumbling to just over 345,00 acres in 1820,
resulting largely from the collapse of cotton prices and national banking liquidity, the debt from the
credit program reached an unsustainable level. Congress reacted with a land relinquishment
program in 1820, which allowed settlers to give up a portion of their holdings in exchange for
canceling out their land debts. Over the next decade, Alabama’s annual land sales averaged just
over 155,000 acres. Government intervention in the market for public lands revealed how banking
credit was connected directly to the plantation system in the short term and indirectly to territorial
expansion in the long term. It took more than a decade for farmers of all ranks to recover from the
debt incurred through the federal land credit program. By May 1824, purchasers in Alabama had
relinquished over 455,000 acres, close to half of the total nationwide relinquishment of over 1,1
million acres. In December 1824, land forfeitures in Alabama totaled $66,218.24. For the Western
Country as whole, forfeitures by December 1825 totaled over $508,000. In December 1829, the
General Land Office reported that Alabama had reverted more than 402,000 acres for purchase
money of approximately $2 million while forfeiting just over $558,000. At this point purchasers of
public lands still owed over $1.5 million. While banking credit fueled the cotton plantation system,
the indebtedness of small farmers played a significant role in the disposal of publics lands. Each
dynamic contributed in its own way to territorial expansion.107
From the Trans-Appalachian West to the Trans-Mississippi West
Most settlers migrating into the eastern lands of the Mississippi and Alabama Territories
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came from Georgia, the Carolinas, Kentucky, and Tennessee. Beginning in 1814 in the wake of the
War of 1812, migration increased to the Territory of Missouri. According to one report between 30
and 50 wagons were at one point entering the territory daily. Many migrants arrived from
Tennessee and Kentucky. Settlers and federal government officials disagreed on how to distribute
Native land west of the Mississippi River which the government had expropriated from one Native
Nation and then granted to another Native Nation, whose lands had been expropriated east of the
river. Lands in what would become the state of Arkansas were granted to the Cherokee in 1817 in
exchange for their migration out of the Mississippi Territory. The treaty granted the Cherokee as
much land as they had ceded east of the Mississippi River, with no western border specified.
Settlers would eventually win control over the policy by forcing Native Nations into reservations
on remote lands north of Texas in what would become the state of Oklahoma.108
Joining settlers from the Ohio Valley, farmers from the Mississippi Territory also migrated
to the Missouri Territory along the White, Missouri, and Platte Rivers farther north. By the time
Congress established the Arkansas Territory in March 1819, the Missouri Territorial Legislature
had already created five counties, registering a population in 1820 of 66,586, well ahead of the
population of the Mississippi Territory at the end of its first decade in 1810, which numbered
40,352. Between 1802 and 1819, parts of the Northwest territory together with the territories of
Orleans, Indiana, and Illinois joined the Union as the states of Ohio, Louisiana, Indiana, and
Illinois, representing a combined population in 1820 of about 946,000 inhabitants. After Congress
created the territory of Florida in 1822, no new territories appeared until the establishment of the
Territory of Wisconsin in 1836. However, settler migrations into the trans-Mississippi West
proceeded briskly, with the towns of New Orleans and St. Louis registering populations in 1820 of
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27,176 and 10,020. Between 1820 and 1830, settlers established the towns of Oliver’s Grove,
Minnesota, in 1820; Little Rock, Arkansas, in 1821; Victoria, Texas, in 1824; Vancouver,
Washington, in 1825; Wabasha, Minnesota, in 1826; and Oregon City, Oregon, in 1829. Not long
after establishing their homesteads, towns, and counties, settlers began setting up banks, with three
chartered in St. Louis by 1819.109
In the Crucible of Settler Expansion
Liverpool Cotton Prices and Indebted Spinners
As legislators of Alabama’s first State Assembly convened in late October 1818 and
thousands of farmers continued gravitating to the cotton-growing lands of the new state, workers
on the other side of the Atlantic faced an increasingly interconnected set of instabilities at the other
end of the cotton supply chain in and around in Manchester, the center of the British Empire’s
textile industry. During the summer, weavers, spinners, and other workers had organized a series of
strikes in response to increasing exploitation by mill owners and other business concerns, leading
to what radical leaders had begun calling “a general insurrection of all the labouring classes.” With
debts ranging from £150 to £600 despite the low prices of cotton, most fully operational spinning
mills were bankrupt. Workers had also migrated in large numbers to the textile manufacturing
areas, with population increases between 1801 and 1816 in Manchester and Salford of 47.6 percent,
increasing from 94,876 to 140,040. Additionally, laws passed by parliamentary representatives of
the landed gentry resulted in shortages of bread, an increase in hunger, widespread food riots, and
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government repression that culminated in the Peterloo Massacre in August 1819 in Manchester.
Known as the Corn Laws, the acts artificially propped up the price of grain by prohibiting imports
below a price threshold. To add to the instability, thousands of decommissioned seamen of the
British navy faced unemployment with the defeat of the French at Waterloo in 1815 and the end of
the Napoleonic wars. Cotton prices swung as political conflict erupted in the wake of international
peace.110
In Liverpool, the price of cotton between 1818 and 1819 dropped from 20 to 13 pence per
pound and in New York from 34 to 24 cents per pound. The price of short-staple Cotton in New
Orleans had started dropping from a high of 33 cents per pound in August 1817. By April 1819, it
would sink to 13 cents per pound. By 1820, Europe was buying 50.9 percent of Britain’s piece
goods and 95.7 percent of its yarn production, while the US was buying 9.5 percent of its piece
goods.111
Yet the drop in the price of cotton in 1818 was not the first-time farmers were forced to
default on their debt payments. Between 1805 and 1808, the annual average price of cotton in New
Orleans had fallen from 23.3 to 13.6 cents per pound, partly resulting from the trade embargo
imposed by the Jefferson administration in retaliation for the European impressment of US
merchant sailors during the Napoleonic wars.112 As agricultural technology in the long-term
lowered production costs, political upheavals and changing policy agendas created short-term
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periods of fluctuating prices. What transformed an unsurprising price slump into the nation’s first
major breakdown of production and exchange was the uneven development of a large nationwide
public credit system in the form of banknotes and discounts. In their effort to generate dividends
and returns on investment, bankers created an unwieldy mismatch between circulating currency
and the hard cash upon which liquidity rested. While indebted small farmers were less implicated
in the unstable banking system than those planters, merchants, bankers, and politicians most
responsible for local and national banking policies, they nevertheless contributed to the economic
collapse through their greater numbers and small-scale indebtedness.
The Banking and Credit Collapse of 1819
At the same time cotton prices began dropping in the fall of 1818, officials in the US
Treasury Department and at the second Bank of the United States (BUS) were scrambling to find
the money to pay the first installment of the loan taken out in 1804 by the Jefferson Administration
as payment for the Province of Louisiana. The terms of the loan, which the investment houses of
Hope and Baring secured and paid for through bond issuances to numerous European investors,
required a first payment of over $3 million within 15 years. That date was now just around the
corner. To assemble the specie, William Jones, president of the BUS, reversed the bank’s liberal
policies with state banks of accepting notes in lieu of specie and renewing discounts. By curtailing
the issuance of credit of the largest capitalized bank in the country, Jones triggered a massive
domino effect in which many, if not most, of approximately 185 state-chartered banks, having
issued more than $67 million in loans and discounts, were caught short. Many bankers refused
Jones’s request to transfer their specie to the Bank of the United States. Many bankers who
attempted to comply were forced to suspend specie redemption.113
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Insolvency spread from banks to their customers. Possibly as many as 100 banks closed as a
result of the banking collapse. Without credit or a medium of exchange, merchants and businesses
failed throughout the East. Unemployment reached 50 percent in Pittsburgh and Philadelphia.114
Poorhouses became inundated with large numbers of the indigent. Production and exchange
dependent on liquidity and credit decreased to the bare minimum. The economic downturn in
numerous areas lasted beyond the mid-1820s. As one historian writing during the Great Depression
of the 1930s described the collapse:
The depression which broke upon the country in 1819 likewise reflected the conditions
usual to severe depressions. Immigration to this country was greatly curtailed. Prices of
agricultural produce declined rapidly, leaving certain sections of the Country with crops
which would not stand the cost of transportation to the market at prevailing prices. Land
values and real estate depreciated to a fraction of their former values, and in many cases
could not be sold at all. Debtors were faced with the loss of their property, and the creditors
who secured possession of it were unable to realize their equity in the property through sale
of it. Unemployment abounded, and large sums were spent for poor relief. Commercial
failures were numerous. Large debts were erased through bankruptcies. Bank failures and
suspensions occurred throughout the country, and even the government could not obtain
from its normal source of revenue enough funds with which to meet its regular
expenditures, and was forced to borrow. The enactment of relief legislation was the
principal occupation of state legislatures during this period. Discontent and distress
permeated the entire nation.115
The settler project had run aground on its own debt-driven contradictions. The exigencies of
honoring sovereign debt as a solution to paying for Thomas Jefferson’s Empire of Liberty would
take precedence over the needs and demands of settlers of all ranks for credit and establish the
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conditions for the rise of a populist movement led by future president Andrew Jackson, whose
career spanned the quintessential settler roles of planter, speculator, merchant, military officer,
debtor, and creditor.
By 1819, there was no going back to a credit and monetary system free from the boom-andbust risks of an unstable currency and an uneven distribution of privately controlled credit systems
without fundamental revisions of the republic’s national and state constitutions. As the Panic of
1819 created the template for a debt-driven settlerism of the next several generations, back in
northern Alabama, James Irwin and William Harris, small farmers–who, like thousands of others,
had accumulated debt to pay for land at inflated prices–lost their farms. And like many others,
Harris reentered the migration and settlement cycle, moving north into Tennessee. A large portion
of Alabama indebtedness was the result of high land prices charged by speculators, who had paid
for land using Mississippi stock provided as a settlement with federal legislators in the fraudulent
Yahoo land claims sold over two decades earlier. In South Carolina, the banking collapse and
deflation led to an estimated emigration of nearly 70,000 farmers during the following decade.
Planters experienced a debt overhang when the cotton produced by enslaved workers on their
plantations failed to cover the debt payments for land and enslaved people. The imperative of debtdriven settlerism to occupy the trans-Appalachian West was floundering under the weight of its
survival constraints.116
As small farmers and urban workers bore the brunt of the downturn, others had shrewdly
positioned themselves in ways that enabled them to escape the worst consequences of the crisis.
Those emerging from the chaos at the top of the heap of market competitors included the directors
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and stockholders of the Bank of the Mississippi. Despite suspending specie redemption in the
aftermath of the War of 1812, the Bank of the Mississippi, renamed as the Bank of the State of
Mississippi, managed to avoid specie suspension during the banking collapse of 1819. Through a
resolution sponsored by Mississippi state legislator Beverly Grayson in January 1820, the
legislature required the land office west of the Pearl River to deposit its revenues from land sales
into the Bank of the State of Mississippi. As a result, the Bank was able to maintain the liquidity to
ride out the contagion of bank runs, marking another irony revealed through the rescue of
Mississippi’s principal creditor institution by the funds procured from speculators, planters, and
small farmers. Using its state legislated privilege of automatic collection of outstanding loans, the
bank ended 1820 with an increase of $72,628.55 in bills receivable for a total of $1,334,847.11,
despite statewide levels of land and chattel debt that would stifle production and exchange for a
decade. Recognized for its conservative lending policies that restricted credit to the bank’s
preferred customers, the stockholders and directors of the bank ensured that credit would benefit
some while leaving others to face the consequences of indebtedness, precarity, and migration.117
Metropolitan Settlers and Colonial Transitions
As the banking collapse threatened to derail the settler agenda to extend the formation of
new territories beyond the Mississippi River following the pattern of the 1787 Northwest
Ordinance, the debt settlers owed to the federal government for purchases of public lands had by
1820 reached $22 million, which if paid back would erase approximately a quarter of the total
public debt of approximately $90 million.118 With three decades of surplus accumulation tied to
territorial expansion in the trans-Appalachian West, settlers transformed the contours of a new
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American gentry through their agendas around land, credit, and debt. While state legislators
representing the core of an emerging base of wealth and power–based on profits from land
speculation, cotton, wheat, livestock, and other settler revenue streams–began forming statemanaged banks, settler representatives at the federal level in Washington ironed out what would be
the most comprehensive debt relief and land ownership reforms since the Harrison Land Act of
1800. The minimum parcel size decreased from 160 to 80 acres, and the minimum price decreased
from $2 to $1.25 per acre. In place of the credit system, Congress instituted a sweeping program of
relinquishments in which indebted holders canceled their debts to the government by returning a
portion of their lands to the public domain. While the relief measures succeeded in dramatically
decreasing the public land debt through relinquishments of land rather than outright debt
cancelation, the measures continued to honor creditor-friendly legal regimes instituted by the
Founders. Small farmers continued to be the foot soldiers in the hierarchy of settlers, whose top
echelons many aspired to reach through debt-financed farming and slaveholding.
In addition to federal efforts to resolve the problem of unsustainable land debt, state
legislatures also enacted a variety of forms of debtor relief with the State of Kentucky taking the
lead. A debtor relief movement emerged which succeeded in voting in its gubernatorial candidate.
The Kentucky State Assembly charted a state-owned bank to assist indebted farmers by providing
borrowers with up to $1,000 in loans and issuing currency that would be accepted as payment for
taxes. Additionally, it passed stay laws that protected debtors from the seizure of their lands. In
most other states, especially in the East, however, debtor relief movements met with less success,
echoing some of the intra-class conflicts of the late 1780s and 1790s that surfaced in the
Constitutional Convention and during the Washington Administration. To the extent small farmers
allied with larger farmers and planters, the interests of debtors in western states such as Ohio,
Illinois, Louisiana, Tennessee, and Kentucky found the political leverage to temporarily loosen the
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creditor hold on power.119
Just as the directors of the Bank of the State of Mississippi found a backdoor to the problem
of preserving their shareholders’ equity amid the economic collapse around them, the Treasury
Secretary and the president of the BUS found their own backdoor to the problem of honoring the
debt obligations owed to European bondholders for the 1803 purchase of the Province of
Louisiana, of whom Barings Brothers & Company was a major stakeholder. In 1818, bank
directors of the BUS arranged for additional loans with Baring Brothers & Company, Reid, Irving
& Company, and Thomas Wilson & Company. However, they were still short. South Carolina
Representative Langdon Cheves, newly appointed president of the BUS, miraculously found a path
forward when he secured an agreement with bondholders to defer payments for an additional three
years provided the delayed payments included the accrual of additional interest.120 Unlike other
newly independent governments in the Americas that found no backdoors during the 1820s that
prevented defaults on loans provided by Barings, officials of the federal government were able to
preserve the creditor and debtor underpinnings crucial to the nation’s exclusionary expansion and
uneven economic development.
For small farmers in search of cheaper lands in areas such as the Territory of Missouri,
economic collapse slowed the pace of expansion. As the pace of land sales slowed, settlers
abandoned settlements in Missouri, despite an increase in population of 235 percent during the
previous decade. But the collapse did not stop migration and land sales altogether. The Territory of
Missouri joined the Union in 1821 with more than 66,000 inhabitants based on the 1820 census. By
1819, the federal government had created seven territories in the trans-Appalachian West, all of
which had transitioned to states within this timeframe. With a special provision in the Enabling Act
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for the Territory of Illinois, it entered the Union in December 1818 with 20,000 fewer than the
60,000 required by the Northwest Ordinance. Beyond the Mississippi, the Territory of Orleans,
created in 1800, became the State of Louisiana in 1812. Of the lands east of the Mississippi, the
only areas that remained to be organized in 1820 as either states or territories were Michigan and
Wisconsin in the North and Florida in the South. Within a framework of unstable global
agricultural commodity markets, interdependent circuits of credit and debt had nearly capsized the
project of territorial expansion. With cheaper western lands belonging to Native Nations becoming
available and the periodic loosening of the legal-military regime of credit and debt, settlers would
continue to be able to finance migrations and be disciplined at the same time by indebtedness that
fueled further migration.121
Within the larger context of Atlantic colonial power, settler expansion had developed out of
the divisions between and within European metropoles and New World peripheries. During the
first two decades of the 19th century, a hierarchy of settlers reformulated three centuries of
monarchical and republican mercantilism based on political and economic bipolarities between the
mother country and its colonies. Metropolitan interests, driven largely by inter-imperial political
and economic rivalries, superseded and dominated the interests of colonists. Whether Dutch,
Portuguese, Spanish, French, or British, settlers of various ranks in the colonies conformed in
varying degrees to the dictates of imperial policymakers promulgated through the office of the
governor, the imperial military, or directly from the central authority. Through these structures of
governance, armed trading companies, representing a range of monied interests, financed colonial
enterprises, whose main objective was a satisfactory return on investment. A bifurcated and
asymmetric imperial framework encouraged independent yet connected spheres of political and
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economic regimes. The viability of often highly tenuous settlements required tacit recognition on
the part of metropolitan officials and investors of the needs of a settler labor force, which
nevertheless faced conditions harsh enough in the mother country for it to opt for risky and
uncertain prospects, which most notably included debt bondage in the form of indentured servitude.
As colonial hierarchies either willingly or begrudgingly transferred surplus to their
metropolitan authorities, enough wealth remained behind for the emergence of a local gentry,
whose power over the local labor force increased over time. As a byproduct of mercantile policy,
the scarcity of coin and the liquidity it represented served as a key factor within the colonies in the
development of a debt-driven settler political economy. In the case of the British Empire, power
wielded by local aristocracies within its colonies was less derived from fiscal policy than from
credit and debt regimes. By 1820, the settler state had established over 260 banks with a total
estimated capital according to one banking historian of approximately $137 million. Within the
following 20 years, the total loans and discounts of US banks amounted to over $462 million after
decreasing from $525 million in 1837 in the aftermath of the Panic of 1837.122
While the top echelons of the settler hierarchy consisted largely of the families of the
British lesser gentry, legal institutions protecting hereditary privileges of the British system of land
tenure were, in certain key cases, left behind. The newly won autonomy of an emerging and
dynamic settler hierarchy reflected a divergence from and adaptation of European patterns of rule
by monarchies and landed nobilities. Colonialists in the mother country sought ways for the
colonists to pay for the legal-military infrastructure in both jurisdictions of the colony and the
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central kingdom. When metropolitan officials mounted aggressive attempts to extract revenues
from colonists to pay for £130 million spent in large part as a result of the Seven Years War, intraclass conflict spilled into armed struggle as propertied colonists insisted on taxing only for their
own share.123 To the extent the intra-class conflict shifted power from the landed gentry in the
metropole to the lesser gentry in the periphery, the colonists’ victory represented a power shift in
kind. To the extent the settler gentry institutions of legal-military governance that subjugated the
majority of small propertied and propertyless settlers, the colonists’ victory represented a power
shift in degree.
As part of the governance of a sprawling British Empire, intra-class conflicts continued to
play out between the Crown’s Cabinet and factions in Parliament, shaping colonial policy most
notably in the West Indies, Canada, India, and Australia. Royalist rule by decree met with
revolutions in key locations within the French and Spanish empires. The colonial order of the
previous three centuries gave way to networks of European-American planters, merchants, and
manufacturers, whose power rested on newly formed national armies, local militias, and banking
credit. The trans-Appalachian West became a laboratory for a new self-expansionary logic of land,
labor, and liquidity. As a Euro-American laboratory with roots in the British system of land tenure
and class conflicts over land, it was by no means the first experiment in self-expansionary surplus
accumulation. Several generations of English colonialists stretching back to the late Tudors had
been using Ireland as laboratory for developing a modern repertoire of empire.124
The challenge for settlers was to fashion a creditor-friendly regime enforcing long-term
credit market discipline within a short-term environment of fluctuating commodity prices that
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would generate enough surplus accumulation to enrich the higher echelons of the settler hierarchy
and enough debt-driven liquidity to compel small farmers to participate in a credit market as
debtors. One of the principal changes accompanying the rise of a new Euro-American settler
hierarchy centered around property relations and land tenure. Whereas in Britain, land tenure
regimes slowly loosened the traditions of leasing from manorial lords and the customary
inalienability of land, in the US republic the 1787 Ordinance stipulated at once the standard right of
a freehold in fee simple with no adherence to the doctrines of primogeniture or entail as the new
legal standard of land tenure in the new territories. By implementing the Ordinance, new territories
guaranteed the commodification of land in an auction-based market that, despite efforts by
Treasury Secretary Albert Gallatin to even the playing field between speculators, planters, and
small farmers, favored speculators at the expense of small farmers. At the same time, the
constitutional protection of contracts and the prohibition on government issued paper money
increasingly placed the control of public credit largely in the hands of state bankers.125
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CONCLUSION
In exploring the political economy of settler expansion in the trans-Appalachian South,
three observations stand out: Given an average note offered for discounting at the Bank of the
Mississippi of over $500 and the annual income from semisubsistence farming between $200 and
possibly $300, small farmers were excluded from banking credit networks available to upper
echelons of the settler hierarchy. Given unstable commodity and land markets as reflected by
cotton prices and land values, the indebtedness of small farmers, amplified by the federal land
credit program, resulted in land forfeitures and relinquishments, which left many with few
alternatives besides migration. Given a legal-military regime that generally favored creditors over
debtors, the unequal access to liquidity settlers needed to manage the debts stimulated the
development of cash crop markets while at the same time increased the risk of insolvency for small
farmers. Within this context, settler expansion was a product of the conjunctural conflicts and
divisions between white settler groups, enslaved Black communities, and First Nations. Circuits of
credit and debt played a significant role in the creation of the conditions for an expanding settler
empire.
The institutional roots of debt-driven settlerism stretch back into 16th and 17th century
British financial and legal innovations. The creation of the Bank of England in 1694 laid the basis
for the rise of a financial class of private creditors, who had already institutionalized the practice of
contracting and marketing government bonds in the late 1660s. As part of this process, its directors
took control over the issuance of money, as a form of privately managed circulating debt secured
by taxes, consolidating its power over both lending and government licensed currency. Creditors
expanded their gains in 1732 when the British Parliament passed the Debt Recovery Act. The act
extended legal rights to creditors, many of whom were British merchants attempting to collect on
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debts owed to them by colonists, to seize land and slaves in the collection of debts. The act
overturned older law which designated land to be beyond the reach of creditors. The new precedent
took hold in the colonies and became standard legal doctrine, benefiting not only merchants in
Britain but merchants in the colonies as well. With these legal and financial mechanisms in place,
credit became a force for uneven capital accumulation and economic growth subject to periods of
expansion and contraction. Settler expansion took shape in the context of the rise of state-chartered
banking during the formative decades of the new US republic, establishing a pattern of periodic
credit-related booms and busts.126
The struggles over indebtedness and access to credit experienced by small farmers in the
trans-Appalachian South during the first decades of the 19th century also pointed to major political
transformations brought about by the Northwest Ordinance, the territorial governments, the state
constitutions, and the federal Constitution. Architected largely by the descendants of the lesser
gentry, some of whom had fled the British Civil Wars as royalists to the Colony of Virginia, the
Northwest Ordinance and the federal Constitution placed power in the hands of the top echelons of
a white settler hierarchy both in the central government and in the territorial periphery. Local
militias, sheriffs, constables, the posse comitatus, the federal army, and navy enforced the laws of a
legal-military infrastructure that had developed from the wars against Britain and Native Nations as
well as the violent suppression of slave rebellions. A dual federalism, based on federally arbitrated
power-sharing amongst an expanding number of semisovereign republics, reformulated the
colonialist pattern of a unitary metropole and a dependent and subordinate periphery.127
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As settler expansion in the trans-Appalachian corridor unfolded, the balance of power in the
trans-Appalachian West leaned toward the territorial legislatures, which determined the pace and
nature of an expansion that was contingent on the cooptation and resistance of populations deemed
to be outside the white settler hierarchy. Competing factions of the gentry in the Mississippi
Territory were able to delay the sales of millions of acres of public lands until the territorial
government had fully resolved conflicts over competing land claims. Once sales of public land
finally began in 1809, the territorial legislature controlled the chartering of banks and the issuance
and distribution of banking credit and currencies. Infighting between regional factions
characterized much of the policymaking process, with the Natchez plantocracy often under attack
by other groups in the Piney Woods and Tombigbee areas.
While representatives in the territorial legislature were required to own at least 200 acres of
land, they were, more often than not, members of the wealthy landed and merchant groups.
Eligibility for electing representatives was restricted to free male inhabitants of full age owning at
least 50 acres, which did not prevent planters and speculators from dominating the electoral system
and the policymaking process. To the extent sovereignty extended to the lowest ranks of the settler
hierarchy, which included small farmers, the territorial government prevented popular discontent
from reaching the levels in places such as New York, which experienced antiproprietor revolts
during the 18th and into the early 19th century.128
While settlers transformed the governance structure of their polities, they transplanted and
adapted a British socioeconomic system stripped of some of the vestiges of ancient manorial land
tenure and hereditary titles that had protected the upper nobility. As part of the vast majority of
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immigrants making up the lowest ranks of the settler hierarchy, small farmers, descended from
indentured servants, unskilled laborers, and tenant farmworkers, faced similar challenges their
ancestors across the Atlantic faced in their efforts to escape the traps of indebtedness, insolvency,
debtor’s prison, precarity, and pauperism. Despite the availability of millions of acres of land, land
speculators compelled small farmers to take on debt as the only way to acquire land. Indebtedness
for small farmers led to forfeitures and migration as the pool of unevenly distributed liquidity was
made available through banks to planters, large farmers, and merchants. The virtually unlimited
availability of expropriated land and limited social mobility mitigated against the development of
debt peonage that characterized other regions of North America.129

Struggles over agricultural debt also characterized agrarian labor systems in other areas of
North America. While debt-financed small farming in the Mississippi Territory was by and large
incomparable to the debt peonage of the Viceroyalty of New Spain and the newly independent
Republic of Mexico, aspects of debt peonage reveal the special role debt played in US settler
expansion. As a form of servitude that included slavery, serfdom, indentured service, and penal
servitude, debt peonage developed New Spain as a system of labor broadly based on advances of
cash or goods provided by landowners to agricultural laborers that placed laborers in relationships
with landowners ranging from voluntary dependency to coercive servility. By docking laborers’
wages until debts were repaid, landowners created the possibility for a bonded condition enabling
production and surplus accumulation. Several forms of debt peonage emerged in different regions
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at different times, distinguished by degrees of coercion and indebtedness and largely associated
with the hacienda system.130
While in some areas such as the sugar haciendas of Morelos, voluntary debt peonage
offered stability unavailable to growing numbers of rural wage laborers whose lands had been
confiscated by hacendados. In other areas such as Coahuila, landlords used the power of the state to
prevent peons from escaping from various forms of unpayable and extra-legal debt-bondage, which
would be passed on to the next generation or transferred with the laborer when acquired by another
landlord. By contrast, small farmers in the trans-Appalachian South owed their debt primarily to
the government, local merchants, factors, and cotton ginners. Unlike the coercive peonage in parts
of New Spain that tied workers to the haciendas, debt assumed by small farmers led to land
forfeitures that compelled them to migrate. The incorporation of small farmers into the circuits of
credit and debt served to lubricate economic expansion, which underpinned settler migration.
Commercial credit in New Spain centered around the Catholic church, mining companies, and
merchant-landlords, known as agiotistas, who financed the dispossession of peasants and, in
making short-term loans, resembled the private lending practices of merchants in northern Europe
and its colonies. While Mexico’s population increased 2.7 million from about 6 million in 1810 to
8.7 million in 1874, the population of the US increased from 7.2 million to 50.1 million. There
were many other differences between Mexico and its northern neighbor that factored into their
divergent trajectories, but to the extent labor systems played a role in demographic and economic
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change, different forms of indebtedness retarded or accelerated expansion.131

The unprecedented scale of migrations between 1800 and 1820 in the trans-Appalachian
West were driven by an interplay between political economic and cultural institutions. Given the
size and diversity of migrant populations, myriad cultural rationalizations and motivations
emerged, including those associated with religious and republican liberty, personal and collective
security, financial and political autonomy, and varieties of personal dissatisfactions,
disappointments, and opportunities. Underlying these rationalizations and motivations were
political and economic institutions enabling the social and material reproduction of settler
communities. While motivations help in understanding a part of migration and settlement, social
relations within the context of production and exchange explain the process at the scale with which
the trans-Appalachian West was settled. Average higher wages and living standards in the new
republic compared to Europe did not preclude the existence of crises and aggravating
contradictions in the political economy for populations obscured by averages. To the extent the
decisions made by the heads of households to migrate involved major life-changing risks, they
reflected the greater risks of staying in place and not migrating.132
As the twin resources mitigating against precarity, harsh financial conditions, poverty, and a
host of environmental and biological calamities, fertile land and the labor to cultivate it served as
the basis for the production and exchange of the goods that enabled the social reproduction of

131

James Cockcroft, Mexico: Class Formation, Capital Accumulation, and the State (New York: Monthly
Review Press, 1983), 26–27, 53, 57; Alan Knight, “Mexican Peonage: What Was It and Why Was It?”
Journal of Latin American Studies 18, no. 1 (May 1986): 48; Cockcroft, Mexico, 26–27, 53, 57, 64; Alan
Knight, “Mexican Peonage,” 48; Charles H. Harris III, A Mexican Family Empire: The Latifundio of the
Sanchez Navarro Family, 1765–1867 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1975), 58–59, 75.
132
Citing genealogical investigations, Thomas Clark and John Guice dismiss debt as a general motivation
for migration in favor of “unfavorable social and political conditions,” migratory kinship ties, and “suitable
land.” Thomas D. Clark and John D. W. Guice, Frontiers in Conflict: The Old Southwest, 1795–1830
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1989), 180–182.

87

individuals and their societies. Yet, for those without money needing to acquire fertile land and the
means of cultivating it, credit became a third necessary resource besides land and labor. The debt
small farmers took on was not just an embarrassment for executors of wills and the probate courts
to administer. Debt was the key to the liquidity that determined who was primarily a factor of
production and who was by and large an accumulator of surplus.
The feat of marshaling a labor force of more than 2 million migrants, occupying parts of the
approximately 509,000 square miles of the trans-Appalachian West by 1820, was an
accomplishment on a world-historic scale. In just over three decades, a liberated lesser gentry
created a framework for settler expansion in its quest for surplus wealth and the power to maintain
and accumulate it. Planters, large farmers, merchants, speculators, and bankers fashioned a system
of surplus accumulation and extraction derived from the development of Atlantic and increasingly
global markets for cotton, wheat, sugar, and other agricultural commodities. As the labor
component of the settler framework, smallholders, squatters, tenant farmers, and agricultural wage
laborers transformed the borderlands into territorial frontlines using European legal-military
institutions adapted to the unique conditions of the northern, central, and southern transAppalachian regions. Native Nations and enslaved workers of African origin determined the
character, shape, and contours of the transformation. Astute colonialists had been aware early on of
the institutions underlying the settler project. One notable example was the British governor of
Quebec and North America, Lord Dorchester, who recognized that settlers viewed property
ownership as a solution to the challenges of financial security, political participation, and social
respectability.133
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During the 1820s, in the aftermath of the banking collapse and economic downturn, credit
and debt would become major issues for federal, territorial, and state governments as well as for
leading planters who dedicated their careers to the politics of settler expansion. As the federal
government debated and passed legislation granting various forms of debt relief, the legislatures of
Mississippi and Alabama sought to harness the power of credit through the chartering of statecontrolled banks. Reaching an inflection point with the nationwide economic downturn following
the banking collapse of 1819 and the establishment of five states and two territories during
President James Monroe’s administration, Congress waited more than a decade until 1836 before
reembarking on the creation of new territories.
Debt would also ironically come home to roost on a personal level for the three principal
architects of the debt-driven planter empire. Former President Thomas Jefferson, having placed the
public in debt for $15 million in order to purchase the Province of Louisiana and having used debt
to coercively negotiate land cessions from Native Nations, would die in debt in 1826. Both former
President James Monroe, a principal author of the Northwest Ordinance and the chief negotiator in
Paris of the debt-financed purchase the Louisiana Purchase, and former President James Madison, a
principal author of the federal Constitution that made the nation safe for foreign credit, would face
insolvency before their deaths in 1831 and 1836. Other leading figures of settler expansion during
this period experienced lifelong indebtedness, ended their lives in debt, or passed away in debtor’s
prison. These included Daniel Boone, whose experiences in the 1780s and 1790s became the basis
for nationalistic myths of settler expansion, John Piatt, one of the wealthiest bankers of the transAppalachian West who died in debtor’s prison, and Thomas Worthington, senator from Ohio and
Chairman of the Committee on Public Lands.134
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With the first three decades of the 19th century establishing a general pattern for the
remainder of the century, periodic debt deflation following periods of credit expansion would lead
to crises for all ranks of the settler hierarchy. In the scramble for liquidity, state legislatures passed
laws starting in 1838 that replaced previous requirements for legislative charter approval with bank
bonds to secure the issuance of banknotes, ushering in a new era of free banking. Despite the
greater availability of credit, even planters at the top of the wealth ladder would face survival
constraints during periods of debt deflation. During the 1840s, credit market discipline introduced
by creditor-friendly legislators in states such as South Carolina, which punished planters unable to
pay back debts with insolvency, compelled planters to intensify their strategies to access liquidity
as a means of avoiding ruinous debt overhangs. In the 1850s, in the northern Piedmont area of
Georgia, over 70 percent of settlers with probated estates died leaving behind debt obligations. The
economic dislocation of the Civil War added to the levels of indebtedness and destitution for small
farmers in the Georgia Upcountry. Despite the Homestead Act of 1862 granting settlers free land,
small farmers continued to struggle with credit and indebtedness. The indebtedness of small
farmers would contribute to the rise of populist agrarian movements that culminated in the
Farmers’ Alliance in the 1870s and the Populist Party in the 1890s.135
Entanglements with the growing circuits of credit, in large measure more by exclusion than
by incorporation, brought small farmers in closer contact with capitalist relations. These
entanglements suggest a strong link between the development of 19th-century capitalism and
settler migrations, occupation, and the displacement of Native Nations west of the Appalachian
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Mountains during the first phase of the development of the US nation-state. The quest for liquidity
would lead to the further development and expansion of banking. As one of the rising banks
providing credit financing to businesses and governments during the latter half of the 19th century
through to the first decade of the 21st century, the firm of Lehman Brothers began its activities in
the 1840s when founding brothers Henry and Mayer Lehman arrived in Montgomery, Alabama,
from Bavaria Germany. Setting up a dry-goods store and shortly thereafter becoming cotton
factors, they moved to New York City, where they began specializing in investment banking. In
2008, 160 years later, the firm would find itself at the center of another major banking collapse
associated with a real estate bubble that in significant ways echoed patterns established by white
settlers in the 1810s in the trans-Appalachian South. Indebted small farmers and bankers in the
trans-Appalachian South played no small role in the making of a settler nation.
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